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The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question “what factors contribute to the 
differing levels of democratic success in the post-Soviet republics?” The thesis draws on 
political theory and historical approaches to examine all 15 of the post-Soviet republics 
as a group in order to identify common trends, and then investigates two particular case 
studies—Russia and Kyrgyzstan—for further insight. Using the Freedom House scores to 
measure levels of democratic development, the thesis focuses on two important factors 
that contribute to democratic success: the balance of power among the elites at the 
moment of transition and the nature of the initial constitutional framework. The first 
theory posits that the power dynamics of leadership between the democrats and those 
supporting the ancien régime are crucial in determining the level of democratic 
development. The second theory concentrates on the impact for democracy of the type of 
constitutional framework adopted—whether parliamentary, presidential, or some mixture 
of the two. The thesis examines the merits of these two variables and concludes that an 
analysis combining them offers the most useful explanation of what contributes to the 
differing levels of democratic success. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 offered a unique set of circumstances for 
political scientists, particularly those interested in studying democratic transitions. 
Almost overnight, newly independent states emerged, offering an opportunity to observe 
how these new nations would develop institutionally and otherwise. In 2002, Michael 
McFaul described these conditions as follows: “Simultaneous regime change in two 
dozen countries—all beginning in roughly similar places but moving along very different 
trajectories over ten years—provides the perfect data set for testing extant theories and 
developing new hypotheses about regime change.”1 Operating from the premise outlined 
by McFaul, this thesis attempts to answer the question “What accounts for the varying 
levels of democracy, or democratic success, in the post-Soviet republics?” By narrowing 
the focus to only the post-Soviet republics (and omitting the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
states and the Yugoslav successor states), this research integrates the political scientific 
approach that McFaul alludes to with a more historically focused methodology, in order 
to answer the research question generally, regionally, and through in-depth case studies.  
While numerous scholars have attempted to answer this question, either directly 
or indirectly, two important studies have been published that offer compelling arguments 
regarding which factors account for varying levels of democratic success for countries in 
transition. Relying on these two persuasive academic studies, described in detail in 
Chapter III, this thesis examines the important factors that contribute to or undermine 
democratic development in the post-Soviet space. This thesis investigates the hypothesis 
that the most important factor in fostering a developed democracy is the rise of 
democratic leaders at the point of transition because they develop strong parliamentary 
systems and institutions. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, comparisons 
between the post-Soviet republics generally, and two countries in particular (chosen from 
                                                 
1 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54 (2002): 212–244. 
 2 
the different sub-regions of the post-Soviet republics), will be made in order to isolate 
which factors contribute the most to democratic success. 
B. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
In addition to the primary purpose of this endeavor, to find a satisfying answer to 
the stated research question, this thesis also serves some tangential functions: assessing 
the validity of previously published arguments, and developing an original explanation 
based on the combination of two factors. 
Beginning with the primary purpose first, this thesis is intended to contribute to a 
greater understanding of democratic development. The link between democracy and 
respect for human rights standards makes research on democracy significant.2 In essence, 
any contribution to the body of knowledge that furthers democratization in practice 
enjoys a level of normative significance.3 This thesis endeavors to contribute to that body 
of research in the hope that the cumulative knowledge of the scholarly work on 
democratization will promote democratic development and respect for human rights 
standards around the world.  
This thesis adds to the scholarly discourse from three perspectives—from a 
general political science angle, from a regional standpoint, and from the individual 
country level. From the first perspective, as a general contribution to political science, 
this thesis tests the validity and universality of two existing theories regarding democratic 
development and consolidation. While the arguments presented in Michael McFaul’s 
“The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World”4 and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach’s “Constitutional 
Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism”5 
                                                 
2 “Democracy and Human Rights,” accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/ 
democracy/human_rights.shtml.  
3 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 2.  
4 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.”  
5 Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism,” World Politics 46 (1993): 1–22.  
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provide convincing explanations for factors that foster democracy, this thesis evaluates 
the validity of those arguments in the post-Soviet context. In reviewing McFaul’s study, 
this work will take the conclusions that held up in 2002, when the article was published, 
and see if they remain accurate using updated information on the post-Soviet republics 
from 2016. Any outliers from the 2016 evaluation will contribute to the selection of the 
two countries examined further in case studies. As for Stepan and Skach’s work, this 
thesis expands the scope of their argument to include all of the post-Soviet republics, 
rather than only the fully functioning democracies examined by the authors. This effort 
tests the applicability of Stepan and Skach’s conclusions more broadly, while 
contributing to the original hypothesis of this thesis: that both theories combined offer the 
most persuasive explanation for the differing levels of democracy within the post-Soviet 
context.  
In addition, aside from commenting on two important studies within the general 
political science debate on democracy, this thesis provides insight into the differences 
within the different “sub-regions” of the post-Soviet space. By examining all of the 15 
republics, based on the regional subdivisions in Adrienne Warren’s article, this thesis 
offers insight into the unique characteristics of each sub-region’s transition and state-
building experience.6  
Lastly, using the case-study methodology, which allows for the examination of 
the intricacies of a few nations, this thesis considers the particular histories of two post-
Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The depth of analysis offered by case study 
research allows for a more complete understanding of the specific circumstances, and 
often uncovers additional variables for evaluation that have been overlooked by a 
generalized political science perspective.  
C. STRUCTURE 
For clarity, this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II begins with a basic 
overview of democracy in general and definitions of terms. This overview serves to 
                                                 




create a common understanding, but also to immediately focus the effort. Essentially, 
democracy and democratization can prove expansive topics with many different aspects, 
so isolating the factors to be explored here proves crucial.  
The discussion in Chapter II is brief because the priority of effort, in Chapter III, 
centers on describing, validating, and expanding on the two primary theories, those 
presented in McFaul’s “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: 
Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World”7 and Stepan and Skach’s 
“Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus 
Presidentialism.” 
Chapter III also covers the general arguments and tenets of each of the theories in 
the aforementioned articles, including caveats and potential issues with categorizations, 
generalizations, and assumptions inherent in the theories. These two theories provide the 
framework of the hypothesis.  
Once the theory and hypothesis have been outlined, Chapter IV undertakes an 
assessment of their validity in regard to the post-Soviet republics. In order to demonstrate 
the validity of the theories, each of the post-Soviet republics is categorized. This ensures 
that neither of the theories alone answers the research question. The two data sets are 
combined to determine if both factors—the power balance of the leadership and 
constitutional framework—help to account for the differing levels of democratic 
freedom.  
The assessments consider general adherence and thus the empirical consistency in 
a post-Soviet context of the theories and the hypothesis, as well as the regional trends and 
specific exceptions. When applicable, the consistency of the theory throughout different 
time-periods or for countries not originally considered by the authors is employed to 
expand the scope and understanding of the theories. For instance, does this correlation 
occur promptly? If not, how long is the process until the democratic regime solidifies? 
Do countries move between levels of democracy, and if so, why? Also, the country 
studies look for additional factors that might provide insight into differences between 
                                                 
7 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.”  
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regions, as well as any territorial disputes or ethnic identity considerations that might 
skew the results. Any exceptions discovered throughout the analysis conducted in 
Chapter IV help to provide the justification for the case studies of Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
found in Chapters V and VI. These case studies examine why these particular examples 
do not align with the two established theories, or the original, combined hypothesis set 
out in detail at the end of Chapter III.  
Within the case-study framework in Chapters V and VI, analysis of two countries, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia, offer detailed insight into two distinctive post-Soviet 
experiences. As mentioned, these two particular nations were chosen because their 
extraordinary circumstances seemed to deviate from the expected course anticipated by 
the theories and the general pattern in one of the sub-regions. The sub-regions emerge 
mainly out of geographical considerations, based largely on Adrienne Warren’s divisions, 
but common cultural and historical experiences were also considered.8 The four sub-
regions include Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine), the Caucasus 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). These 
particular countries were chosen based on the insight into the cultural dynamics of their 
particular regions, as well as in light of unique experiences that have the potential to 
undermine the validity of the hypothesis. Using a more historically oriented process in 
these two chapters, rather than the more comparative politics-focused methodology used 
in Chapters III and IV, Chapters V and VI present a chronological narrative designed to 
highlight the nuances of the events that transpired, rather than a broad-brush 
generalization or categorization as used in Chapters III and IV. 
Chapter VII sums up the conclusions of this thesis from a political science 
standpoint, providing feedback on the validity of two established theories, the utility of 
one original, combination hypothesis, and some general notes on regional comparisons 
and exceptions. From a historical perspective, the thesis analyzes two exceptional cases 
(Russia and Kyrgyzstan) that can provide deeper insight into the general phenomenon. 
                                                 
8 Warren, “Comparing Democracy Rankings.” 
 6 
Overall, if this thesis provides greater understanding of what factors contribute to the 
differing levels of democratization in the post-Soviet republics, than the endeavor will 
have been worthwhile. Since the thesis begins with a general analysis of major theories 
but uses two case studies to further analyze the theories and factors influencing levels of 
democracy, it sets up a study that can offer general conclusions while at the same time 
beginning the analysis needed to complement the larger hypothesis. This thesis suggests 
future research regarding the application of the Combination Hypothesis to non-post-
Soviet republics, as well as further case studies in the post-Soviet region.  
  
 7 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
The following section provides important information fundamental to the 
discussion of which factors account for the differing levels of democratic development in 
the post-Soviet republics. This background outlines the definitions used in the remainder 
of the analysis.  
A. DEFINING THE POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS 
The post-Soviet republics consist of the fifteen nations that had previously been 
Union Republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Due to their differing geographical 
circumstances and pre-Soviet experiences, each post-Soviet nation has a unique cultural 
and historical narrative. The differences among the republics contribute to their 
distinctive post-Soviet characteristics.  
B. DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 
Scholars have long been studying and writing about democracy and related topics, 
such as democratization, democratic development, and democratic transitions.9 Often the 
conclusions drawn differ from a political scientist’s point of view and from an historian’s 
perspective. Political scientists often look for correlations and factors that generally apply 
across many states, regularly using large data sets. Historians, on the other hand, usually 
delve into the specifics, examining either a particular country or time period. The 
differences between the two perspectives are important for this research because both the 
political science and historical points of view are incorporated in the final product. It 
helps to consider both bodies of scholarly knowledge when attempting to answer the 
stated research question. From a political science point of view, for this research 
question, potential answers are derived from comparing factors for a wide range of cases, 
highlighting trends from all of the post-Soviet republics. From these trends, specific 
                                                 
9 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).  
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countries in particular time periods are examined further through more typically historical 
sources and through the case study method.  
In order to discuss the relative levels of democracy achieved by the post-Soviet 
republics, certain concepts and terms must be defined and qualified. To start at the 
beginning, what is meant by the term democracy? How is this term defined and measured? 
What characteristics or attributes are required for a country to be deemed a democratic 
nation? While democracy is an important foundational concept, this thesis focuses on the 
factors that have contributed to the current level of democratic development achieved by 
different nations. Nevertheless, a basic definition of democracy helps set the stage for 
comparison. For the purposes of this study, the term “democracy” is defined with minimal 
qualifications and in the broadest possible fashion. This allows for greater inclusion for 
states that have not yet reached the liberal, consolidated, or durable democratic standard 
that many European or Western states have achieved. Therefore, as Larry Diamond writes, 
“if we think of democracy as simply the rule of the people, as a system for choosing 
government through free and fair electoral competition at regular intervals,” we have 
established a baseline definition for research and analysis.10 Although minimalist, and 
perhaps seemingly devoid of valuable information, this definition at least creates a subtle 
distinction between a government that can be influenced by its citizens, and one whose 
governing processes fail to take any input from its populace.11 
Many scholars have dedicated their academic careers to studying, defining, and 
understanding the origins of democracy and the distinctive qualities that make a state 
democratic. Depending on perspectives and priorities, a number of definitions have 
emerged.12 Should the definition focus on competition and participation? Or on 
procedures and processes? Numerous works by academic giants in the political science 
field, such as Arend Lijphart, Larry Diamond, Robert A. Dahl, Juan J. Linz, Seymour 
Martin Lipset, and many others, have considered in detail the different political 
                                                 
10 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 3.  
11 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. 
12 Dahl, On Democracy, 37. 
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constructs, institutions, party arrangements, voting mechanisms, and civil society factors 
that differentiate democracies from their non-democratic counterparts.13 In their article 
“What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 
emphasize the multi-faceted nature of democracy when they discuss the  
generic concepts that distinguish it as a unique system for organizing 
relations between rulers and the ruled…(the) procedures, the rules and 
arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure…(and) operative 
principles that make democracy work.14  
Despite all the different aspects they consider, Schmitter and Karl come up with 
an answer along the same lines as Diamond. Therefore, this paper will use their definition 
of democracy:  
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting 
indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives.15  
Providing a concise review of the scholarly contributions to the understanding of 
democracy beyond definitions is difficult, especially when considering both the political 
science and historical sources. This is difficult not only because of the breadth of research 
available, but also because the definitions and measurement standards that scholars use 
often vary and overlap. Usually when scholars begin to discuss the different institutions, 
frameworks, laws, policies, and other political constructs that make democracies 
distinctive, elements of quality and classifications begin to emerge. Samuel Huntington 
illustrates this point by stating that  
                                                 
13 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Diamond, Developing Democracy; Dahl, On 
Democracy; Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy ed. 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); 
Douglas V. Verney, “Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government,” in Parliamentary Versus 
Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Seymour Martin 
Lipset, “The Centrality of Political Culture,” in Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend 
Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
14 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” in The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 50. 
15 Ibid. (italics added)  
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to some people, democracy has or should have much more sweeping and 
idealist connotations. To them, “true democracy” means liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, 
honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal 
participation and power, and various other civic virtues.16  
If the definition of democracy can encompass such a wide variety of concepts and 
factors, then it is no surprise that related terms and concepts involve an equally large 
number of considerations. For instance, considering one relevant concept for this study, 
scholars often differ on their definition of “democratic success.” Does this term simply 
mean survivability, as Guillermo O’Donnell suggests, or is a level of quality required as 
well?17 If quality proves an important factor, how is that expressed? Does that require 
“deepening,”18 as Fritz Plasser, Peter Ulram, and Harald Waldrauch suggest, or 
“authenticating,”19 as John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes suggest, or must a country 
obtain the title “consolidated democracy” in order to be considered successful? 20 To that 
end, what conditions must exist for a democracy to reach consolidation?21 Is 
consolidation an endpoint, and if so, when has a state reached this distinction?22  
In order to reduce the confusion, and use the least subjective method available, this 
thesis will use the Freedom House rankings to measure democratic success or “level of 
democratic development.” The fact that Freedom House has been measuring democratic 
levels for decades, across a well-defined set of standards, proves one of the greatest 
advantages of utilizing Freedom House data. This continuity in assessment allows for relative 
comparisons and helps to avoid limiting labels, although certain general classifications are 
                                                 
16 Huntington, The Third Wave, 9.  
17 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” in Consolidating the Third Wave, ed. Larry 
J. Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 41. 
18 Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, and Harald Waldrauch, Democratic Consolidation in East-Central 
Europe (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 9.  
19 John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, “The Real World of Civic Republicanism: Making Democracy 
Work in Poland and the Czech Republic,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 6 (2000): 1044.  
20 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996).  
21 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (1998): 91–107. 
Many other scholars have contributed to the debate over consolidation in addition to Schedler.  
22 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.  
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used throughout Chapters III and IV. Terms such as “democracy,” “partial democracy,” and 
“dictatorship,” will be used, but in an instructive way that corresponds with the Freedom 
House scores. Freedom House scores of 1 to 2.5 represent “free” states, or “democracies”; 
scores of 3 to 5 represent “partially free” states, or “partial democracies”; and scores of 5.5 to 
7 represent polities that are “not free” or “dictatorships.”23 The Freedom House scores for 
the post-Soviet republics are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   2016 Freedom House Scores for the Post-Soviet Republics24 
POST-








Comparative Score  
(1 Low; 100 High) 
Armenia 5 4 4.5 46 
Azerbaijan 7 6 6.5 16 
Belarus 7 6 6.5 17 
Estonia 1 1 1 94 
Georgia 3 3 3 64 
Kazakhstan 6 5 5.5 24 
Kyrgyzstan 5 5 5 38 
Latvia 2 2 2 86 
Lithuania 1 1 1 91 
Moldova 3 3 3 60 
Russia 6 6 6 22 
Tajikistan 7 6 6.5 16 
Turkmenistan 7 7 7 4 
Ukraine 3 3 3 61 






                                                 
23 “Methodology,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/methodology.  
24 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2016,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.  
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Overall, the Freedom House scores offer a consistent measurement of the 
democratic levels within a country over time that serve as a baseline for relative 
comparisons. Table A in the Appendix includes the Freedom House scores for each of the 
post-Soviet republics from 1991 to 2016.  
C. WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO DEMOCRATIC QUALITY? 
Even when consensus can be reached in terms of measuring success, the debate 
continues among scholars regarding which factors contribute most significantly to 
democratic development, and under what circumstances. Generally, this thesis views 
these factors as falling into two categories—internal or external. Internal factors, as the 
name suggests, focus on how the internal characteristics of the state contribute to levels 
of democratization. How leaders and political parties structure institutions, for example, 
indicates how the decisions made within the nation-state contribute to democratic 
governance.25 Other examples of internal factors include political parties, electoral 
institutions, civil society, the rule of law, interest groups, and constitutional 
frameworks—just to name a few.26 External factors, on the other hand, consider the 
power dynamics and influence that external players and the global environment have on 
democratic institution-building. The role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
play in fostering democratic values, for instance, shows how a country’s democratic 
development does not occur in a vacuum, nor is it immune from outside pressures.27 
Other examples of external factors include membership in intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), relationships with global or regional powers, economic 
interdependence, cultural ties, and the globalization of democratic norms—just to name a 
few.28 This thesis focuses more on internal factors because arguably a country’s 
willingness to engage with outside actors, or how the country views the external power 
                                                 
25 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. 
26 Larry Diamond et al., ed., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).  
27 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999).  
28 “Democracy and Global Forces,” in The Changing Nature of Democracy, ed. Takashi Inoguchi, 
Edward Newman, and John Keane (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), 117–170.  
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dynamics, develops fundamentally from internal factors—the perspective of the 
leadership, support for democracy, the institutions, and so on.29  
Even when considering only the internal factors that influence democratic 
development, distinctions between factors arise.30 Broadly, this thesis argues that internal 
factors can be split into those that focus on the political environment and the conditions 
that exist within nation-states prior to a transition, and those that characterize the internal 
situation after transition. For instance, considering the internal state of a country prior to 
transition may indicate the most effective mode of transition to pursue, as well as the 
main actors and causes of transition. A country that experiences a military coup, for 
example, will experience post-transition democracy differently from a nation-state that 
transitions due to a popularly supported change in government.31 The pre-transition 
analyses have merit, as they explain what led to independence as well as indicating what 
potential difficulties can arise in developing high levels of democratic development. For 
this study, however, the research focuses on the post-transition factors; not because all 
post-Soviet republics had the same “domestic” situations prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but because determining what brought about the USSR’s demise will not 
parse out the reasons behind the differing levels of democratic development in the 
aftermath of its disintegration. Essentially, the post-Soviet republics have a generally 
similar transition story overall in that the collapse of the Soviet Union greatly contributed 
to the events leading up to their independence. This is not to say that all post-Soviet 
republics experienced the same circumstances (transitions were accompanied by ethnic 
conflict and violence in many republics), but this study concentrates on their post-
transition internal conditions. Of course the post-transition situation facing each country 
will be, to some extent, a product of the pre-transition environment, but the circumstances 
and actions that occurred after the post-Soviet republics became newly independent states 
is the focus of this study.  
                                                 
29 Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
30 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, ed., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
31 Huntington, The Third Wave, 111.  
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Therefore, like many studies, this thesis will focus on internal factors at the point 
of transition and afterward, i.e., basically the decisions and actions that defined and 
influenced the character of the newly independent state. These factors can include the 
character or ideology of the leaders and elites, the institutions or structural organizations 
established, the existence and vibrancy of the civil society, the presence and role of 
NGOs, the membership in IGOs, the level of economic development, the implementation 
of a market economy, and several other variables, all of which apply to the post-transition 
environment. While these internal factors each have linkages with democratic 
development (and in many instances correlate strongly with it), this thesis holds that most 
of these factors arise, or can be seen as by-products of, a newly independent state’s 
character against two metrics: the ideology of the leadership and institutional 
frameworks.  
To evaluate the legitimacy of that assumption, findings from the diverse and 
widespread studies that examine democratic success have been investigated. As expected, 
of all the sources considered, the two studies selected for further scrutiny relate to the 
character of the leadership and elites at the point of transition and the type of 
constitutional framework a newly independent state adopts. These findings, examined in 
the next chapter, have been chosen not only for their logically convincing explanations, 
but also for their apparently quantifiable legitimacy. Admittedly, part of the appeal of 
these two studies comes from their attempts to classify and label nation-states, in order to 
compare them. In addition, these sources were considered because the states’ behavior 
relating to these particular factors account for, or affect, the other factors previously 
mentioned.32 As an example, the type of institutions developed could prove crucial in a 
state’s democratic success because those institutions could either protect or undermine 
the vitality of the civil society, and so on.33  
Therefore, based on their logic, qualitative labeling, and explanatory power, the 
two chosen theories are used due to their ability to explain the differences in the post-
Soviet republics’ levels of democratic success. For ease of description, they are called the 
                                                 
32 Huntington, The Third Wave. 
33 Casper and Taylor, Negotiating Democracy. 
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Balance of Leadership Theory and the Constitutional Framework Theory. These two 
theories, each of which offer a key factor in explaining the relative levels of democratic 
success a country can achieve, are outlined in greater detail in Chapter III. Chapter IV 
presents an assessment of the theories’ applicability to the post-Soviet republics.  
  
 16 
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III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS  
The following chapter outlines the key theories and resulting hypothesis this 
thesis uses to assess the levels of democratic success achieved by the post-Soviet 
republics. The two theories, the Balance of Leadership Theory and the Constitutional 
Framework Theory, and the hypothesis, the Combination Hypothesis, establish the 
specific factors this thesis focuses on to examine the democratic development of the 
states within the post-Soviet space.  
A. THE TENETS OF THE BALANCE OF LEADERSHIP THEORY 
The first factor that explains the differences in the post-Soviet republics’ level of 
democracy, put forth in Michael McFaul’s “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and 
Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” examines the 
ideology and the balance between the leadership, or potential governing elites, at the 
point of transition.34 In other words, the theory examines the balance between (a) the 
group of potential leaders with a democratic ideology, and (b) the group of potential 
leaders with a communist ideology, within the newly independent state.35 As an “actor-
centric” approach to analyzing post-communist countries, the theory considers the 
“balance of power between supporters and opponents” of a democratic or autocratic 
regime.36 In essence, the theory examines the internal power struggle, or cooperation 
between, actors who wish to pursue a democratic post-transition system, and those that 
prefer a less democratic approach. Some scholars have asserted that a balance between 
the two groups creates cooperation, and therefore the development of lasting democratic 
values.37 McFaul describes how this cooperative theory suggests that a balance between 
the challengers and ancien régime fosters democracy:  
                                                 
34 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.”  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 213.  
37 McFaul provides an excellent summation of the scholarly discussion in McFaul, “The Fourth 
Wave,” 214–220.  
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Because neither side had the capacity to achieve its first preferences 
through the use of force, the sides opted to negotiate power-sharing 
arrangements with their opponents, which represented second-best 
outcomes for both. Often called “pacts,” these power-sharing 
arrangements negotiated during transition were then institutionalized as a 
set of checks and balances in the new democracy.38  
While plausible in theory, the findings in “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and 
Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World” suggest that 
while the cooperative method may have been successful in other contexts, the theory does 
not hold up in the post-Soviet experience.  
Conversely, McFaul’s theory argues that it was the state of “unequal distributions 
of power that produced the quickest and most stable transitions from communist rule.”39 
In other words, the study argues that the “ideological orientation of the more powerful 
party largely determined the type of regime to emerge.”40 Democracies emerged in 
countries where the new leaders were mostly democrats, whereas in states where the 
dictators enjoyed the balance of power post-transition, stable non-democracies resulted. 
In instances where the power was more evenly distributed, situations of “protracted 
confrontation, yielding unconsolidated, unstable partial democracies and autocracies” 
were the norm, as indicated in Figure 1.41  
 
Figure 1.  The Balance of Leadership Theory 
                                                 
38 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 213. 
39 Ibid. (italics in original) 
40 Ibid., 213–214. 











“Balance of Power for Challengers” 
(Unbalanced favoring Democrats) 
“Balance of Power for Even or Uncertain” 
(Balanced) 
“Balance of Power for Ancien Régime” 
(Unbalanced favoring Autocrats) Stable Dictatorships 




Logically, this theory seems plausible; it makes sense that a majority group within 
a newly founded government would be able to ensure the establishment and enforcement 
of laws and institutions aligned to its ideology. McFaul demonstrates this point when 
discussing democracies: “And hence institutions of power sharing or checks or balances 
did not result from compromises between the ancient regime and democratic challengers 
but rather emerged only if the hegemonic democrats chose to implement them.”42 
Regardless of the ideology of the founding elites, democratic or dictatorial, they would 
have an easier time creating a government in their image simply due to their sheer 
numerical advantage.  
In some ways inserting their ideology into the newly forming institutions and 
customs would prove easier for the dictatorial majorities as they would not have to 
deviate as greatly from the status quo, compared to the newly mobilized democratic 
majorities that faced a complete reversal of their government’s ideology. In either case, 
the importance of the balance and ideology of the leadership at the point of transition and 
its impact on future levels of democratization has a logical correlation.  
B. THE TENETS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK THEORY 
The second study used as a framework for determining the key factor in differing 
levels of democratic success, while at the same time being subjected to a validity test in a 
post-Soviet republic context, is outlined in Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach’s 
“Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus 
Presidentialism.”43 As the title suggests, the article examines “the impact of different 
constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation.”44 While the concept of 
democratic consolidation differs from the more general concept of democratic 
development, Stepan and Skach’s arguments inspired a hypothesis. Essentially, the article 
states that the constitutional frameworks of the most longstanding democracies fall into 
three categories: “presidential (as in the United States), parliamentary (as in most of 
                                                 
42 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 214. 
43 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks.”  
44 Ibid., 2.  
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Western Europe), or a semi-presidential hybrid of the two (as in France and Portugal).”45 
Of the three, Stepan and Skach argue that a (pure) parliamentary regime is a system of 
“mutual dependence” that facilitates democratic consolidation. Conversely, in a (pure) 
presidential system, the “mutual independence” of the president and the legislature makes 
democratic consolidation more difficult.46  
While technically the authors applied their argument only to democracies, this 
thesis endeavors to stretch their conclusions to all post-Soviet republics—democratic and 
otherwise. Due to the fact that all post-Soviet republics hold elections, albeit to differing 
degrees of legitimacy and openness, this thesis posits that the theory can apply across all 
the post-Soviet states. Plus, since none of the post-Soviet republics overtly prohibit 
elections, and still attempt to appear democratic in some form or another, particularly to 
outside audiences, the wider applicability of the theory ought to be tested. Therefore, 
although Stepan and Skach’s theory applies specifically to democracies, it will be 
expanded on here to test its validity to non-democracies in a post-Soviet context. As with 
democracies, the assumption remains (for the same reasons) that countries with 
parliamentary constitutional frameworks have higher levels of democratic success than 
those with presidential systems, and that those with a mixed system fall somewhere in-
between. In Stepan and Skach’s words, “In this article we bring evidence in support of 
the theoretical argument that parliamentary democracies tend to increase the degrees of 
freedom that facilitate the…attempt to consolidate their democratic institutions.”47 
Again, this thesis acknowledges that their research focuses on democratic consolidation, 
which in the literature is a specific concept, and that their general premise is being 
expanded here to comment on levels of success in pursuing democracy, or the quality of 
democracy. The problems associated with making this leap and expanding the context are 
acknowledged.  
The Constitutional Framework Theory hypothesizes that countries that develop 
parliamentary constitutional frameworks will develop stable democracies, while those 
                                                 
45 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks,” 2–3.  
46 Ibid., 3–4.  
47 Ibid., 2. 
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that favor presidentialism as a constitutional construct will create dictatorships, and that 
those that establish mixed constitutional frameworks will lead to partial democracies. 
Figure 2 shows a pictorial representation of the theory.  
 
Figure 2.  The Constitutional Framework Theory 
In order to understand why the Constitutional Framework Theory, as it has been 
dubbed here, should apply beyond the stable democracies that Stepan and Skach 
examined, a greater understanding of different constitutional frameworks offers context. 
In much of the literature, scholars focus on two types of constitutional frameworks—
parliamentarianism and presidentialism.48 Juan J. Linz provides a concise definition of 
parliamentary systems: “A parliamentary regime in the strict sense is one in which the 
only democratically legitimate institution is parliament; in such a regime, the 
government’s authority is completely dependent upon parliamentary confidence.”49 
Stated another way, in parliamentarianism, the head of the government, acting as the 
chief executive, gets his legitimacy through the support of the legislature rather than 
through direct elections.50 Again, as Linz points out, parliamentary systems can have 
presidents, even those elected through popular vote, but they “usually lack the ability to 
compete seriously for power with the prime minister.”51 The fact that parliamentary 
regimes can have directly elected presidents or heads of state can make identifying a 
parliamentary system difficult. Having a sense of the relative power balance between the 
                                                 
48 Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”; Verney, “Parliamentary Government and Presidential 
Government.” 
49 Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” 125.  
50 Ibid. 
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head of state and the head of government, as well as knowing where the executive power 
is concentrated, becomes crucial in determining if a state is a purely parliamentary 
system, or a regime with a different type of constitutional framework. Stepan and Skach, 
the authors of the foundational work behind the Constitutional Framework Theory, 
highlight the “system of mutual dependence” that parliamentarianism offers, along with 
what they determine as the two major features: 
1. The chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the 
legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence. 
2. The executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of state) 
has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections.52 
With this definition of parliamentarianism, the two other types of constitutional 
frameworks remain to be specified. Linz describes a presidential system as follows:  
In presidential systems an executive with considerable constitutional 
power—generally including full control of the composition of the cabinet 
and administration—is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and 
is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence. He is not only the 
holder of executive power but also the symbolic head of state and can be 
removed between elections only by the drastic step of impeachment.53  
The crucial distinctions between parliamentarianism and presidentialism, as hinted at 
before, center on the power of the executive and his relationship with the legislature. In a 
presidential system, the executive has its own electoral legitimacy separate from the 
legislature. In other words, the president, or head of state, is elected directly by the 
people, rather than indirectly by the legislature. Moreover, in presidential systems the 
executive is not dependent on the legislature to remain in power, having been elected to a 
fixed term of office.54 Returning again to Stepan and Skach, when it comes to a pure 
presidential system, presidentialism offers a state of “mutual independence” in which the 
following features arise: 
                                                 
52 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks,” 3.  
53 Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” 125. 
54 Ibid., 126. 
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1. The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own 
source of legitimacy. 
2. The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own 
source of legitimacy.55  
With the single source of power in the parliamentary system (the legislature), 
parliamentarianism differs from a framework with the dual sources of legitimacy in 
presidentialism.56  
The third construct, often discussed separately from (pure) parliamentarianism 
and (pure) presidentialism is semi-presidentialism. Semi-presidential systems, as one 
might expect, combine elements of parliamentarianism and presidentialism. For that 
reason, within this thesis, these hybrid regimes will be called “mixed,” since semi-
presidentialism tends to overshadow the parliamentary aspects, and “semi-parliamentary” 
appears to be absent as a term in the literature. Regardless of name, these mixed systems 
have been described as follows: 
The concept of [a] semi-presidential form of government, as used here, is 
defined only by the content of the constitution. A political regime is 
considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it 
combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by 
universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has 
opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess 
executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them.57  
Stated another way, the mixed systems have an executive chosen indirectly by the 
parliament, and subject to votes of no confidence, while at the same time having a 
directly elected president, for a fixed term with considerable power—both which vie for 
executive influence. France’s Fifth Republic offers a prime example.  
The distinction between a presidential system and a mixed system can be difficult 
to identify with simply a cursory knowledge of a nation’s government. Often, a deeper 
                                                 
55 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks,” 4.  
56 Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” 135. 
57 Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” in 
Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 142. 
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understanding of the state’s constitution, and the power distribution and powers afforded 
the different power holders, must be obtained before a nation can be slated into one of the 
categories. Again, since these distinctions can prove tricky, Andre Krouwel outlined a 
number of areas of constitutional organization that help scholars classify a state.58 These 
categories include head of state elections, dissolving the government, appointing the 
cabinet and other ministers, positions responsible to parliament, holders of legislative 
powers, holders of executive power, and votes of no confidence.59 Using these indicators, 
and knowing the constitution of a nation, one could determine if the state governed using 
a parliamentary, presidential, or mixed form of constitutional framework. For instance, 
using the “holder of executive powers” consideration, the question is who holds the 
executive power within the state. For a parliamentary system, the head of state has no 
executive responsibilities, whereas in a presidential system the head of state does have 
executive powers. And, for the mixed system, the “president has substantial executive 
prerogatives, but most executive power rests with the prime minister and the cabinet.”60 
Using all the different matrixes provided by Krouwel’s analysis, any state can be 
classified into one of the three constitutional frameworks. Table B in the Appendix 
provides the extensive breakdown of these categories. While independently identifying 
the type of constitutional framework for each post-Soviet republic would be instructive, 
space does not permit such an endeavor. Instead, the classifications used by other 
scholars will be utilized for this study. Chapter IV provides the details. 
Each constitutional framework comes with potential benefits and drawbacks. 
Understanding the potential, or theoretical, benefits and drawbacks of a particular 
construct can shed light on the experiences of the post-Soviet republics and determine if 
the choice of constitutional framework has contributed to their current level of 
democratic development. Many scholars suggest that a parliamentary system helps foster 
greater levels of democracy. According to Linz, “a careful comparison of 
                                                 
58 Andre Krouwel, “Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and 
East European Countries,” Acta Politica 38 (2003): 333–364. 
59 Alan Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential, 
and Parliamentary Distinction,” European Journal of Political Research, April 1, 2003.  
60 Krouwel, “Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism,” 345. 
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parliamentarianism as such with presidentialism as such leads to the conclusion that, on 
balance, the former is more conducive to stable democracy than the latter.”61 The mutual 
dependence that Stepan and Skach referred to in their article helps illustrate the point. In 
fact, they go so far as to list the “observable tendencies” that a pure parliamentary system 
offers over its presidential counterparts:  
its greater propensity for governments to have majorities to implement 
their programs; its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting; its lower 
propensity for executives to rule at the edge of the constitution and its 
greater facility at removing a chief executive who does so; its lower 
susceptibility to military coup; and its greater tendency to provide long 
party-government careers, which add loyalty and experience to political 
society.62  
The majority of the literature reviewed during this research touted the virtues of the 
parliamentary system, particularly in comparison with presidentialism. Much of the 
criticism focuses on the dual legitimacy inherent in the presidential structure. “The 
political activities of parliamentary systems,” Verney observes, “have their focal point in 
parliament. Heads of state, governments, elected representatives, political parties, interest 
groups, and electorates all acknowledge its supremacy. It is tempting to assume that there 
must be a similar focal point in presidential systems. This is not so. Instead of 
concentration there is division; instead of unity, fragmentation.”63 Essentially, since the 
head of government and the head of state have separate sources of legitimacy, both vie 
for power and influence, thus fracturing political power within the state. While Verney 
may have a valid argument, other scholars contend that parliamentarianism leads to 
stalemates and lower levels of effectiveness in governance.64  
Due to the need for consensus, a typical characteristic of parliamentary regimes, 
governments can find themselves mired in quagmires that their constitutional framework 
                                                 
61 Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” 125. 
62 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks,” 22.  
63 Verney, “Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government,” 46. 
64 Gabor Toka, “Political Parties in East Central Europe,” in Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies, ed. Larry Jay Diamond et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Towards Consolidated Democracies,” in Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies, ed. Larry J. Diamond et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
 26 
only exacerbates.65 With parliamentarians unable to come to an agreement, policy and 
decisions can linger in the system and negatively impact government function. A mixed 
constitutional framework brings elements of the parliamentary system and the 
presidential regime into the mix, and the degree to which advantages and downsides arise 
depends in part on the relative power balances inherent in the country’s particular system. 
Understanding the merits and disadvantages of the different constitutional frameworks 
offers insight into how the system a country chooses can either reinforce or moderate a 
country’s natural tendencies. For instance, when a people favor strong, powerful leaders, 
and they implement a presidential system, they may be promoting a situation that makes 
power concentration more likely. While a concentration of power does not necessarily 
always lead to dictatorship, it may make protecting democratic freedoms more difficult.  
The Balance of Leadership Theory and the Constitutional Framework Theory are 
crucial to the main premise of this thesis, the Combination Hypothesis, which is outlined 
as follows.  
C. THE TENETS OF THE COMBINATION HYPOTHESIS 
The theories outlined at the beginning of this chapter, chosen for their explanatory 
logic and supportive data, offer two compelling answers to the research question: “What 
accounts for the varying levels of democracy, or democratic success, in the post-Soviet 
republics?” As noted previously, the Balance of Leadership Theory suggests that the 
power balance between the democrats and the communists in the post-transition period 
explains the varying degrees of democratic success experienced by the post-Soviet 
republics. The post-Soviet republics that had a preponderance of democrats would foster 
democracy, and those with an ascendancy of communists would develop strong 
autocracies. The more evenly balanced systems would ultimately swing between the 
extremes, developing hybrid regimes of partial democracies and partial autocracies. 
Conversely, the Constitutional Framework Theory suggests that the type of constitutional 
framework chosen by each new government will help to determine the levels of 
                                                 
65 Larry Diamond, “Three Paradoxes of Democracy,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. 
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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democracy achieved by the post-Soviet republics, assuming that the theory applies to 
democracies and autocracies alike. Thus, the countries that chose parliamentary 
institutional frameworks would ultimately have stronger democracies than those that 
chose either a mixed or presidential system.  
Owing perhaps to the fact that both theories identified three groups, a connection 
between the two theories emerged during the research. In addition, an analysis of the 
post-Soviet republics showed similarities between certain groups of countries. For 
instance, it appeared that those countries with strong democracies shared similar 
governing structures, particularly when compared to those with the least democratic 
regimes. The hypothesis developed in this research accordingly combines the two 
theories, positing that both factors are required for a country to achieve full democratic 
success in the post-Soviet context. Therefore, the hypothesis becomes, the balance of 
power within the leadership at the point of transition is the key factor that accounts for 
the differences of democratic success in post-Soviet republics because that balance 
determines the type of constitutional framework adopted, which in turn contributes to the 
country’s level of democracy. Figure 3 presents what this thesis calls the Combination 
Hypothesis.  
 
Figure 3.  The Combination Hypothesis 
In essence, both factors are required to enhance the level of democracy reached by 
a post-Soviet republic because the two factors appear inextricably tied. Not only does this 
hypothesis suggest a linkage between variables, it implies an element of cause and effect. 
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The power balance between leaders affects which constitutional framework will be 
implemented, and this choice in turn influences the level of democracy a country can 
achieve. If this is true, only countries with a predominantly democratic leadership will 
choose parliamentary systems and therefore have an optimal chance to be “free.” 
Conversely, any country that has an autocratic preponderance within the initial governing 
elites will choose a presidential system, a choice that may ensure their future “not free” 
status. Lastly, countries with a relative balance between democratic and autocratic elites 
will choose a mixed system that may lead to a “partially free” state. The Combination 
Hypothesis, which posits that combining the two factors may prove crucial, will be tested 




Having outlined the basic tenets of the two theories and the Combination 
Hypothesis, this thesis now assesses their applicability in the post-Soviet space.  
A. DATA ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCE OF LEADERSHIP THEORY 
Aside from its logical consistency, the empirical findings of the Balance of 
Leadership Theory based on McFaul’s arguments are convincing. The data provided by 
McFaul has been reproduced in Table 2 to show his assessment of the post-Soviet 
republics. These assessments describe the balance of power among the elites at the point 
of transition along one axis, and then places each of the post-Soviet republics into a 
category of either “Democracy,” “Partial Democracy,” or “Dictatorship.” The apparent 
consistency of the data with the theory helps explain why this particular argument has 
been chosen for this research project. Table 2 summarizes McFaul’s results. 
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Table 2.   Categorization of the Post-Soviet Republics by Leadership Balance 
and Regime Type—200266 
 
 
McFaul does not provide detailed justifications for how he determined which 
post-Soviet countries fell into each category, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
revalidate McFaul’s categorizations for each post-Soviet republic (aside from the two 
case studies in Chapters V and VI). The relative power balance at the point of transition 
proves especially difficult to verify without preparing time-consuming case studies for 
each republic. For that reason, and since the classifications cannot be reexamined, this 
analysis will assume the accuracy of McFaul’s categorization and McFaul’s data will 
serve as the baseline for this thesis. 
                                                 
66 Adapted from McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 227. Table 2 has omitted the non-Soviet former 
Warsaw Pact countries, leaving just the post-Soviet republics. 























































































Although McFaul’s “balance of leadership” variable is not reexamined in this 
thesis for each country, on the other hand, the Freedom House scores serve as a logical 
confirmation of McFaul’s categorization of each state as a “Democracy,” “Partial 
Democracy,” or “Dictatorship.” Using the Freedom House scores from 2002, when 
McFaul’s article was published, McFaul’s classifications can generally be confirmed.67 
Countries that Freedom House deemed “free,” with a score between 1 and 2.5, can 
confidently be considered democracies, as McFaul assessed, while those labeled “not 
free” by Freedom House and with a score between 5.5 and 7 can be assumed to be 
dictatorships. Likewise, those states called “partially free,” with a score between 3 and 5 
from Freedom House, can be considered partial democracies. Table 3 compares McFaul’s 
classification with the Freedom House scores to determine to what extent the two align.  




Classification FH Score (2002) Match? (Y/N) 
Armenia Partial Democracy 4 Y 
Azerbaijan Partial Democracy 5.5 N 
Belarus Dictatorship 6 Y 
Estonia Democracy 1.5 Y 
Georgia Partial Democracy 4 Y 
Kazakhstan Dictatorship 5.5 Y 
Kyrgyzstan Dictatorship 5.5 Y 
Latvia Democracy 1.5 Y 
Lithuania Democracy 1.5 Y 
Moldova Partial Democracy 3 Y 
Russia Partial Democracy 5 Y 
Tajikistan Dictatorship 5.5 Y 
Turkmenistan Dictatorship 7 Y 
Ukraine Partial Democracy 4 Y 
Uzbekistan Dictatorship 7 Y 
 
                                                 
67 “Freedom in the World 2002,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2002. 
68 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2002”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.” 
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As the table indicates, McFaul’s classifications align with the Freedom House 
assessments of democratic freedoms in all cases except Azerbaijan. While this thesis 
cannot speculate on why McFaul characterized Azerbaijan as a “Partial Democracy” 
rather than a “Dictatorship,” this chart indicates enough consistency that McFaul’s 
classification of the post-Soviet republics in 2002 can be used as a starting point for 
investigation.  
Returning to Figure 1 and McFaul’s Balance of Leadership Theory, the data show 
that the majority of the post-Soviet republics adhere to the Balance of Leadership Theory. 
In other words, those countries with a preponderance of power favoring the democrats 
formed democracies that endured roughly 10 years after independence (measuring from a 
1991 date of independence). Similarly, the majority of the countries that had a power-
sharing advantage oriented towards the former regime created dictatorships that also 
lasted nearly a decade after independence. Lastly, most of the countries that had a power 
balance, rather than an imbalance between the ancien régime and the democratic 
challengers, developed partial democracies.69 While not completely consistent with the 
theory, the data collected and the classifications bestowed by McFaul in 2002 remain 
convincing.  
Also, as the data show, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan fall outside of the 
expected results. As McFaul explains, “The greatest number of cases defying the 
analytical framework outlined in this article are countries where the distribution of power 
was firmly in favor of the challengers yet the regime that emerged after transition was not 
fully democratic.”70 According to McFaul, both Armenia and Georgia fall into this 
category. McFaul explains the discrepancy as follows: “These countries share one 
common problem that the more successful democracies in the region lacked—border 
disputes. To varying degrees, territorial debates sparked wars in the 1990s in all four of 
these countries [that is, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Georgia]. These 
                                                 
69 As McFaul notes, the term “partial democracy” is used as a blanket term for a state that created 
neither a fully democratic nor a fully dictatorial state. He acknowledges that the term “partial democracy” 
could be further deconstructed to differentiate between electoral democracies, pseudo democracies, quasi 
autocracies, competitive autocracies, etc. McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 227.  
70 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 240.  
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territorial conflicts in turn empowered nationalist leaders with poor democratic 
credentials.”71 In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the territorial dispute over the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic continues to be a contentious issue, just as the claims over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia remain controversial for Georgia. Interestingly, while both Armenia 
and Georgia had the same Freedom House score of 4 in 2002, when McFaul published 
his article, and both had territorial disputes that undermined their ability to develop their 
democracies, Georgia has progressed since 2002, while Armenia has regressed. Georgia 
moved up from 4 to 3 in the 14 years following McFaul’s assessment, Armenia moved in 
the opposite direction from 4 to 5. While outside the scope of this project, a deeper 
investigation regarding these two countries could offer interesting insights into how the 
differing natures of these disputes affected each country’s ability to democratize, or its 
level of democratic success.72  
In addition to Armenia and Georgia, the last of the exceptions to McFaul’s results, 
Tajikistan, also experienced exceptional circumstances. Based on the balanced elite 
power dynamics, the theory would suggest that Tajikistan should have developed a semi-
democratic regime. The civil war in the country, however, identifies another crucial 
factor that hinders democratic development, along with the importance of “territorial 
clarity as a prerequisite for democratic transition,” in McFaul’s analysis.73 
Therefore, while these three countries—Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan—
appear to be exceptions to his thesis in 2002, McFaul explains away these exceptions 
when he asserts that “to account for these anomalous cases, two more factors must be 
added to the equation: the presence or absence of territorial disputes and the proximity to 
the West.”74 Although the proximity to the West caveat applies more to the Soviet 
satellites (that is, the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact) than to the post-Soviet 
                                                 
71 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 240. 
72 “Armenia Country Report,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2016/armenia; “Georgia Country Report,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/2016/georgia. 
73 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 220. McFaul’s discussion regarding the particulars of Tajikistan can 
be found in “The Fourth Wave,” 236–238. 
74 McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” 214, 240.  
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republics, McFaul’s assertions regarding disputes appear applicable to the three outlier 
republics (Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan).  
While McFaul can explain the anomalies within the data and results from 2002, 
this thesis examines how the theory holds up when assessing the post-Soviet republics by 
their 2016 measures of democratic success. Utilizing the relative power balances between 
the governing elites at the point of transition from McFaul’s 2002 study as the constant, 
this thesis uses the Freedom House scores from 2016 to see if any of the post-Soviet 
republics that were consistent with to the Balance of Leadership Theory in 2002 no 
longer align in 2016. McFaul’s original assessments of the balance of leadership need not 
be changed because arguably these foundations were determined by conditions at the 
point of transition and would not have changed between 2002 and 2016. Table 4 shows 
McFaul’s classifications from 2002 as compared to the 2016 Freedom House data. 
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Classification FH Score (2016) Match? (Y/N) 
Armenia Partial Democracy 4.5 Y 
Azerbaijan Partial Democracy 6.5 N 
Belarus Dictatorship 6.5 Y 
Estonia Democracy 1 Y 
Georgia Partial Democracy 3 Y 
Kazakhstan Dictatorship 5.5 Y 
Kyrgyzstan Dictatorship 5 N 
Latvia Democracy 2 Y 
Lithuania Democracy 1 Y 
Moldova Partial Democracy 3 Y 
Russia Partial Democracy 6 N 
Tajikistan Dictatorship 6.5 Y 
Turkmenistan Dictatorship 7 Y 
Ukraine Partial Democracy 3 Y 
Uzbekistan Dictatorship 7 Y 
 
As with the 2002 comparison between McFaul’s assessment and the 2002 
Freedom House scores, Azerbaijan still does not align with McFaul’s assessment using 
Azerbaijan’s 2016 score. In other words, arguably Azerbaijan still should not be 
classified as a partial democracy in 2016 based on Freedom House scores, just as it 
should not have been in 2002. More importantly, while Russia and Kyrgyzstan appeared 
to fit within McFaul’s theory in 2002, their 2016 Freedom House scores no longer match 
McFaul’s 2002 categorization. Re-creating the chart provided by McFaul, but using the 
2016 Freedom House scores rather than McFaul’s assessment, a new picture emerges in 
Table 5. 
  
                                                 
75 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2016”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.” 
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Table 5.    Categorization of the Post-Soviet Republics by Leadership Balance 
and Regime Type—201676 
 
 
Based on this data, again using the 2016 Freedom House scores to assess which 
countries fall into the “Democracy,” “Partial Democracy,” and “Dictatorship” categories, 
three more countries appear outside McFaul’s Balance of Leadership Theory. While 
Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan still do not qualify as democracies, presumably for the 
same reasons, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia now appear outside their predicted 
categories. Arguably, Azerbaijan should have been considered a “Dictatorship” in 2002 
based on its Freedom House score, so the two true “movers” from 2002 to 2016 are 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Interestingly, Kyrgyzstan has fared better than predicted by its 
relative power balance at transition since the dictators held the hegemonic position at that 
time. The fact that Kyrgyzstan has managed to develop a “partially free” regime indicates 
                                                 
76 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2016”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.” 


























































































a break from the Balance of Leadership Theory in a positive, increased-democracy way. 
Russia, on the other hand, has moved in the opposite direction. Despite the relative power 
balance present in the regime at transition, Russia appears to have continually moved 
towards institutionalized dictatorship since its independence in 1991.  
B. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON BALANCE OF LEADERSHIP THEORY 
In regard to the post-Soviet republics, a general overview and regional 
examination provide insight into the conclusions offered by the Balance of Leadership 
Theory. 
• General Adherence: As far as general adherence is concerned, as 
Michael McFaul indicated in 2002, the majority of the post-Soviet 
republics achieved levels of democratic success in line with the parameters 
of the theory. This study re-created McFaul’s experiment, using Freedom 
House scores to check McFaul’s classifications, and found that the 
recreation validated McFaul’s findings. The theory proved particularly 
applicable in 2002, when it was published, but still performed 
convincingly using 2016 Freedom House numbers. In 2002, the outliers 
were Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. McFaul’s additional caveats 
explained the outcomes in Armenia and Georgia, while civil war 
(complicated by ethnic conflict) covered Tajikistan. It appears that McFaul 
mis-categorized Azerbaijan, based on 2002 Freedom House scores. As 
mentioned, the theory fared less well in 2016. In addition to Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan, already explained, the comparison 
using 2016 Freedom House scores exposed two genuine outliers, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Still, the fact that 12 out of 15 countries in 2002, 
and nine out of 15 in 2016, had democratic performance levels consistent 
with what the theory would expect indicates a convincing, albeit qualified, 
correlation.  
• Regional Trends 
• Baltics: Considering both 2002 and 2016 data, all three of the 
Baltic countries had democratic success, as the Balance of 
Leadership Theory would predict. The Baltic region was the only 
one to have complete adherence for both time periods. As the only 
three “free” countries, the Baltic states also had a balance of 
leadership favoring the democrats.  
• Caucasus: The three countries in the southern Caucasus region 
fared the worst in terms of reaching the democratic levels that the 
theory expected in light of their relative internal power balances at 
the point of transition. According to McFaul’s initial analysis in 
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2002, only one of the states from the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, fit the 
theory. As mentioned, McFaul’s classification of Azerbaijan as a 
“Partial Democracy” seems questionable, particularly in 2016, so 
perhaps none of the Caucasus states really fit McFaul’s theory. The 
Caucasus faced the same situation in 2016. With Azerbaijan fitting 
fully into the “Dictatorship” category, none of these three states 
supported the Balance of Leadership Theory in 2016.  
• Central Asia: The Central Asian countries appeared to conform 
more fully to the theory than the countries within the Caucasus 
region. In 2002, four of the five Central Asian countries reached 
the expected levels of democracy based on the Balance of 
Leadership Theory. In 2016, that number fell by one when 
Kyrgyzstan performed, democratically speaking, better than 
expected and better than in 2002. In both timeframes, the Central 
Asian countries had the lowest levels of democratic success 
overall, and they were the only countries besides Belarus that had 
internal balances of power favoring autocratic rule. Despite the 
relative balance of power between the challengers and the ancien 
regime, Tajikistan managed to achieve the lowest levels of 
democratic development in the Central Asian region.  
• Eastern Europe: Like Central Asia, the Eastern European region 
had more countries align with the theory in 2002 than in 2016. 
While Kyrgyzstan’s democracy improved over the intervening 
years, Russia’s declined. The total adherence to the theory for the 
Eastern European region in 2002 moved from four to three 
countries based on the 2016 assessment when Russia’s level of 
democratization fell below what was expected based on its initial 
leadership balance of power.  
• Overall: The Balance of Leadership Theory proves convincing with two 
exceptions. Looking at the levels of democratic freedom in Table A in the 
Appendix, which considers the levels of democratic freedom for each of 
the post-Soviet republics since independence, the theory appears to fare 
well in most cases over time. The major exceptions, Kyrgyzstan and 
Russia, offer interesting case studies, which are discussed in Chapters V 
and VI.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
THEORY 
In light of the advantages and shortcomings of the different constitutional 
frameworks discussed in the last chapter, an assessment of the post-Soviet republics with 
respect to the modified Constitutional Framework Theory can commence. Mirroring the 
steps followed with the Balance of Leadership Theory, the applicability of the 
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Constitutional Framework Theory will be tested compared to the 2002 and 2016 Freedom 
House scores for the post-Soviet republics.  
Since Stepan and Skach’s article did not include any data or classifications similar 
to those found in McFaul’s work, this study cannot independently assess the validity of 
their categories. Thus, unlike the data in Tables 4 and 5, the information presented in 
Table 6 is original and based on the following method of classification, beginning with 
2002 data for consistency. 
Unfortunately, finding a single source that classifies all of the post-Soviet 
republics by constitutional framework proved more difficult than expected. Instead, a 
number of sources, all of which considered only some of the post-Soviet states, have been 
compared and contrasted to find the most accurate categorization. Admittedly, the 
patchwork of sources is less than ideal, but without sufficient time to evaluate each post-
Soviet republic’s constitution in accordance with Krouwel’s matrix, this solution is the 
optimal available option. To specify further, the ideal study would compare each 
country’s original constitution with Krouwel’s matrix in order to determine the first 
construct developed by the independent state. This is an important distinction as part of 
the Combined Hypothesis because this study is particularly interested in the type of 
constitutional framework the initial leaders chose for their independent state. Luckily for 
this study, most of the scholarly works offer that distinction, providing the constitutional 
framework for the first constitution, as compared to the amended ones that came later. 
Also, the states that have amended their constitutions since their first version adopted 
upon independence, have been examined closely to determine if the fundamental 
construction of the constitutional framework has been altered. In some cases, it was 
difficult to find the original version, as only the amended version could be readily found 
in English, but an effort was made to address this issue. Further research that could more 
rigorously classify each post-Soviet republic at the point of transition based on its 
constitutional framework would offer a useful contribution to the understanding of the 
post-Soviet republics, but for this study, the classifications existing within the current 
literature will suffice.  
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The effort to classify the post-Soviet republics by constitutional framework began 
with the scholarly literature. The data in the study by Stepan and Skach, the foundational 
work in the Constitutional Framework Theory, covered only the years from 1945 to 1979. 
The post-Soviet countries (including the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states the 
satellites, not just the former Soviet republics) did not register as part of the study. Since 
the arguments in the theory had value despite the fact that the study had been written 
before the post-Soviet republics could be considered, other sources had to be consulted. 
The CIA World Factbook offered useful classifications under the heading “government 
type.” Although these descriptions provided valuable information for the current type, 
they were less useful for the type of constitutional framework developed at the point of 
transition.77 
In his study “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, 
Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction,” Alan Siaroff categorized most of the 
post-Soviet republics, as well as many non-post-Soviet states. His classifications did not 
extend to the Central Asian states or Azerbaijan, presumably because they did not register 
as democracies. It is noteworthy in this regard that Stepan and Skach focused solely on 
democracies as well.78 For the democracies, though, Siaroff provided highly specific 
classifications that differentiated between types of constitutional frameworks.  
Siaroff’s classifications combined with the World Bank data helped to verify the 
most comprehensive of the sources, Robert Elgie’s work. The World Bank data is helpful 
in that it provides an assessment of each post-Soviet republic’s constitutional framework 
going back several decades, but it only provides a distinction between parliamentary and 
presidential systems.79 The combination of the scholarly sources and the World Bank 
data helped validate Elgie’s unpublished “Presidential Power: Presidents and Presidential 
                                                 
77 “CIA World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed April 7, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
78 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies.” 
79 “World Bank Database of Political Institutions 2012,” accessed April 7, 2016, http://go.worldbank. 
org/2EAGGLRZ40.  
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Politics around the World.”80 Elgie, the Paddy Moriarty Professor of Government and 
International Studies at Dublin City University, has published numerous books related to 
constitutional frameworks. His website, from which his classifications are drawn, covers 
each of the post-Soviet republics, often specifying to what year the classification refers. 
Comparing and contrasting the various lists, showed that few classifications differ. In 
most instances, Siaroff’s detailed work resolved the inconsistencies. If Siaroff had not 
considered a particular country, Elgie’s classification was used due to the year supplied 
and the general extensiveness of his work. Table C in the Appendix shows the 
overlapping studies.  
In the search for a single source that provided a classification of the constitutional 
structure of each of the post-Soviet republics, the importance of the distinction between a 
presidential construct and a mixed one came into question. In fact, Stepan and Skach 
focused their study solely on “pure” systems—pure parliamentarianism and pure 
presidentialism—rather than including the mixed, or semi-presidential, frameworks. 
Much of the difficulty in distinguishing between constitutional constructs arose between 
presidential and mixed systems. As the previous definitions demonstrated, much of the 
distinction between the systems, particularly the presidential and mixed, is a matter of 
degree. For instance, does the president “have considerable powers”? Sometimes, even 
when the overt structure is plain, it remains difficult to determine the nuances that 
separate the presidential system from the mixed according to constitutional measures. 
Even when considering a parliamentary system, all of the post-Soviet constitutions have a 
prime minister and a president, so without deeper investigation the distinction can be hard 
to parse out. The overlap of the different studies nonetheless provides a relatively solid 
basis for the remainder of this investigation. Table 6 compares the post-Soviet republics 
by their type of constitutional framework against their Freedom House scores in 2002.  
  
                                                 
80 Robert Elgie, “List of Presidential, Semi-Presidential, and Parliamentary Countries,” Presidential 
Power Presidents and Presidential Politics around the World, accessed April 7, 2016, http://presidential-
power.com/?p=1740. 
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Table 6.   Categorization of the Post-Soviet Republics by Constitutional 
Framework and Freedom House Classifications—200281 
 
 
The data represented in Table 6 show that the majority of the post-Soviet 
republics support the Constitutional Framework Theory outlined in this study. 
Performing about as well as the Balance of Leadership Theory (using 2016 Freedom 
House scores), the Constitutional Framework Theory shows similar promise. It is 
noteworthy that, some of the exceptions to the Constitutional Framework Theory are the 
same as the exceptions to the Balance of Leadership Theory. Table 7 offers a graphic 
representation of the Constitutional Framework Theory’s 2002 results. 
                                                 























































Framework FH Score (2002) Match? (Y/N) 
Armenia Mixed 4 Y 
Azerbaijan Mixed 5.5 N 
Belarus Mixed 6 N 
Estonia Parliamentary 1.5 Y 
Georgia Mixed 4 Y 
Kazakhstan Mixed 5.5 N 
Kyrgyzstan Mixed 5.5 N 
Latvia Parliamentary 1.5 Y 
Lithuania Mixed 1.5 N 
Moldova Mixed 3 Y 
Russia Mixed 5 Y 
Tajikistan Presidential 5.5 Y 
Turkmenistan Presidential 7 Y 
Ukraine Mixed 4 Y 
Uzbekistan Presidential  7 Y 
 
The only exception to both the Balance of Leadership and Constitutional 
Framework theories (using the 2002 Freedom House scores) was Azerbaijan. New to the 
exception list from the Constitutional Framework analysis are Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. For each of these five exceptions, the classifications were 
reviewed again to ensure the most accurate results. While it was impractical to conduct a 
thorough case study for each exception, a review of the sources previously mentioned 
was conducted to see if their constitutional frameworks at transition could be interpreted 
in another way. For instance, all of the sources consulted showed Lithuania as a mixed 
system in 1992. Today’s prevailing perception of Lithuania, according to Jan Zielonka as 
well as the CIA World Factbook, is that of a parliamentary democracy.83 Therefore, 
while the data may indicate that Lithuania’s constitutional framework has shifted over 
time, the crucial consideration is what its first post-independence leaders implemented. It 
                                                 
82 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2002.” 
83 “CIA World Factbook”; Jan Zielonka, “New Institutions in the Old East Bloc,” in The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 2nd. ed. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 210.  
 44 
is important to recall that the Combination Hypothesis attempts to link the balance of 
power of the initial elites with their initial constitutional framework choices.  
Using the same “constitutional framework” variable, the post-Soviet republics 
were assessed in light of the Constitutional Framework Theory using the 2016 Freedom 
House scores. Table 8 presents the results of this comparison. 
Table 8.   Categorization of the Post-Soviet Republics by Constitutional 
Framework and Freedom House Classifications—201684 
 
  
                                                 
84 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2016.” 




















































Again, as with the 2002 data, the post-Soviet republics mostly aligned with the 
results anticipated by the Constitutional Framework Theory. The results turned out to be 
almost exactly the same, with one change. Table 9 provides an additional representation 
of the data. 




Framework FH Score (2016) Match? (Y/N) 
Armenia Mixed 4.5 Y 
Azerbaijan Mixed 6.5 N 
Belarus Mixed 6.5 N 
Estonia Parliamentary 1 Y 
Georgia Mixed 3 Y 
Kazakhstan Mixed 5.5 N 
Kyrgyzstan Mixed 5 Y 
Latvia Parliamentary 2 Y 
Lithuania Mixed 1 N 
Moldova Mixed 3 Y 
Russia Mixed 6 N 
Tajikistan Presidential 6.5 Y 
Turkmenistan Presidential 7 Y 
Ukraine Mixed 3 Y 
Uzbekistan Presidential  7 Y 
 
The 2016 data showed five exceptions, as in 2002, but with some countries 
changing positions. While Kyrgyzstan stood out from the results in 2002, but not 2016, 
Russia emerged as an exception in 2016, but not 2002. Basically, these two nations 
switched positions from 2002 to 2016. With Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Lithuania remaining the exceptions in both years, the switch shows that during this period 
Kyrgyzstan managed to increase its level of democratic success—from 5.5 to 5—while 
Russia’s democracy took a turn for the worse, falling from 5 to 6 over the same period.  
                                                 
85 Adapted from “Freedom in the World 2016.” 
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D. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
THEORY 
Despite the difficulty in finding a single authoritative source to classify each of 
the post-Soviet state’s original constitutional frameworks, the Constitutional Framework 
Theory provides valuable insight regarding the development of democracy in the post-
Soviet republics. While the Constitutional Framework Theory, as outlined in this study, 
expands upon Stepan and Skach’s original argument, the inclusion of all 15 of the 
republics in this study offered an additional layer as analysis. Therefore, the conclusions 
based on the data from the examination of the Constitutional Framework Theory follow:  
• General Adherence: As far as general adherence is concerned, the 
majority of the post-Soviet republics achieved levels of democratic 
freedom consistent with what the theory would suggest. For five of the 
fifteen cases, however, their constitutional framework at transition did not 
translate into the levels of democratic development predicted by the 
theory. These numbers applied to both assessments, those using 2002 and 
those using 2016 Freedom House data. Four out of the five exceptions 
were the same countries for both years, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Lithuania. The final exceptions, Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and Russia in 
2016, rounded out the outliers.  
• Regional Trends: For each region, the majority of the post-Soviet 
republics had levels of democratic success that matched what their chosen 
constitutional framework would suggest. Each region had at least one 
exception. Central Asia had two exceptions in 2002, and Eastern Europe 
had two in 2016.  
• Baltics: As opposed to the Balance of Leadership Theory, all three 
Baltic states did not conform to the predicted parameters of the 
Constitutional Framework Theory. The exception, Lithuania, 
achieved a greater level of democratic success than its mixed 
constitutional framework would have suggested as probable based 
on the theory. How Lithuania managed to increase its levels of 
democratic freedom, in fact rising steadily since its 2.5 level at 
independence to achieve a 1 in 2005 (and every year since), despite 
the inherent risks of a mixed constitutional framework offers an 
interesting option for an additional case study.  
• Caucasus: As with the Baltic states, two out of the three states in 
the Caucasus had democratic freedoms consistent with what their 
constitutional frameworks would suggest. Azerbaijan, the outlier 
here as well, had lower Freedom House scores than its mixed 
system would predict. As with Lithuania, Azerbaijan would prove 
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an interesting case study. It would be advantageous to gain a 
greater understanding of how Azerbaijan’s circumstances cause it 
to defy theoretical expectations. Armenia and Georgia had scores 
that a mixed framework would suggest, with Georgia faring better 
in regard to Freedom House scores than Armenia.  
• Central Asia: As in the other regions, the countries in Central 
Asia mostly aligned to the Constitutional Framework Theory’s 
predictions, but the region also had two exceptions in 2002, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and one exception in 2016, 
Kazakhstan. Faring better in 2016 than in 2002, Kyrgyzstan’s 
transition from “not free” to “partially free” raises questions about 
temporal circumstances for both of these theories. The fact that 
Kyrgyzstan managed to improve over time, more in line with what 
the constitutional framework would suggest, raises the question, 
does it take a certain amount of time for the effects of the choice of 
constitutional framework to become manifest?  
• Eastern Europe: The Eastern European post-Soviet republics 
appeared to match the theory in 2002 before Russian democracy 
declined beyond what the theory would have predicted. With 
Russia the only mover in its level of democratic performance 
between the two time periods, the other countries in the Eastern 
European region held stable over time. Belarus acted as the 
greatest outlier. Despite the fact that all of the Eastern European 
republics chose mixed constitutional frameworks, Belarus’ level of 
democracy consistently fell lower than those of the others. Even 
with Russia’s low Freedom House scores today, the scores are still 
lower in Belarus, a neighbor that reached Russia’s current score in 
1996.  
• Overall: The Constitutional Framework Theory appears to be as 
convincing as the Balance of Leadership Theory. Roughly the same 
number of post-Soviet republics behaved as the theory would predict as 
compared to the Balance of Leadership Theory. The only countries that 
demonstrated movement within the theory, or that conformed during one 
period and not during another, were Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The data 
show Kyrgyzstan’s increase in democratic freedom, and Russia’s 
democratic reversal.  
E. DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINATION HYPOTHESIS 
Upon entering into the research, the author hypothesized that a connection 
between the two theories was plausible. More specifically, something about the findings 
of the two theories sparked the idea that a combination of the two would more effectively 
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explain the varying levels of democratic success in the post-Soviet states. As a reminder, 
Figure 3, presented here again, depicts the Combination Hypothesis.  
 
 
The Combination Hypothesis 
 
The results of analyzing the two theories, determining how well each explained 
the levels of democratic success for the post-Soviet republics, showed equal levels of 
applicability for the two theories separately, using the current levels of democratic 
development (2016 Freedom House scores). While each theory had roughly the same 
number of exceptions in 2016, the exceptions differed between the Balance of Leadership 
Theory and the Constitutional Framework Theory. Table 10 provides a chart that shows 
which post-Soviet republics fit each of the theories in 2016, with the countries listed from 
with greatest levels of democratic freedom (based on Freedom House’s overall 
comparative score) to lowest levels of democratic freedom.  
  
  












“Balance of Power for Challengers”   
(Unbalanced favoring Democrats)   
“Balance of Power for Even or Uncertain”   
(Balanced)   
“Balance of Power for Ancien Régime” 
 
  
(Unbalanced favoring Autocrats)   Presidential Frameworks    
Mixed Frameworks   
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Stable Dictatorships; “Not  
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Unstable Partial Democracies  
and Autocracies; “Partially  
Free” (3 - 5)   
Stable Democracies; “Free” (1 - 
2.5)   
PROVIDES  LEADERS  
THAT CHOOSE:   THAT SECURE:   
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Table 10.   Assessment of the Post-Soviet Republics Using the Balance of 
Leadership Theory and Constitutional Framework Theory86 
Country 
Adhere to Balance of 
Leadership Theory (Y/N) 
Adhere to Constitutional 
Framework Theory? (Y/N) Outcome 
Estonia Y Y 2/2 
Latvia Y Y 2/2 
Lithuania Y N 1/2 
Georgia N Y 1/2 
Armenia N Y 1/2 
Moldova Y Y 2/2 
Ukraine Y Y 2/2 
Azerbaijan N N 0/2 
Russia N N 0/2 
Tajikistan N Y 1/2 
Kyrgyzstan N Y 1/2 
Belarus Y N 1/2 
Kazakhstan Y N 1/2 
Turkmenistan Y Y 2/2 
Uzbekistan Y Y 2/2 
 
The fact that the analyses did not show the same exceptions indicates that the two 
theories may not be inextricably tied. For instance, despite the fact that Lithuania had an 
imbalance of leadership favoring the democrats, the country chose to implement a mixed 
constitutional framework, rather than using parliamentarianism as the other two Baltic 
states did. The fact that Lithuania still managed to secure high levels of democratic 
freedoms proves exceptional.  
The picture provided in Figure 4 offers another visual representation of the data 
collected in the Combination Hypothesis. In essence, this chart “tracks” the movement of 
each post-Soviet republic through both theories. Their current level of democratic success 
(measured by the 2016 Freedom House scores) appears at the end, to the far right. Those 
countries with an imbalance favoring the democrats at the point of transition are shown in 
green; those with an imbalance favoring the dictators are in purple; and those countries 
                                                 
86 The comparative score in the Freedom House refers to the column furthest to the right on Table 1. 
Scores range from 1 to 100, with 1 meaning the lowest levels of democratic freedom, and 100 equaling the 
highest levels of freedom. Adapted from “Freedom in the World, Table of Scores,” accessed March 10, 
2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/table-scores.  
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with a relative balance at transition in yellow. These colors correspond with the Freedom 
House scores that each country should be expected to attain based on the Combination 
Theory. The six countries that behaved as the Combination Hypothesis would predict 
have all capital letters in the last column.  
 
Figure 4.  The Combination Hypothesis Applied to the Post-Soviet Republics 
Figure 4 looks complicated because there are fewer straight lines indicating 
consistency with the Combination Hypothesis than anticipated. Table 11 presents the 
same information, but in a different format. Essentially, Figure 4 and Table 11 show the 
determinist version. Rather than simply tabulating the results of the two theories 
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separately, as Table 10 did, Table 11 takes the balance of leadership at transition as the 
starting point. It then asks, “based on that internal balance of power, did the post-Soviet 
republic choose the constitutional framework as predicted by the leadership balance?” If 
so, the second column gets a Y; if not, an N. From there, if the Constitutional Framework 
Theory were to determine the next step, the question would become “did the country 
attain the level of freedom that the Constitutional Framework Theory would expect?” 
(Y/N). Based on the answers to these questions, using the current, 2016 Freedom House 
data, the determinist chart in Table 11 emerges.  
Table 11.   Assessment of the Post-Soviet Republics Using the Combination 
Hypothesis 
Country 
Based on Balance of 




Based on Constitutional 
Framework Theory - 
Achieve Predicted Level 
of Freedom? (Y/N) Outcome 
Estonia Y Y 2/2 
Latvia Y Y 2/2 
Lithuania N N 0/2 
Georgia N Y 1/2 
Armenia N Y 1/2 
Moldova Y Y 2/2 
Ukraine Y Y 2/2 
Azerbaijan Y N 1/2 
Russia Y N 1/2 
Tajikistan N Y 1/2 
Kyrgyzstan N Y 1/2 
Belarus N N 0/2 
Kazakhstan N N 0/2 
Turkmenistan Y Y 2/2 
Uzbekistan Y Y 2/2 
 
Still, the fact that the examination indicates that the Combination Hypothesis 
applies to six of the 15 countries gives some credibility to the proposed correlation. The 
Combination Hypothesis does not appear to explain the levels of democracy more 
persuasively than each of the theories separately. This is logical because if one of the 
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post-Soviet republics is an exception to one of the foundational theories, it is an 
exception to the entire Combination Hypothesis. Therefore, the Combination Hypothesis 
serves to highlight the impact of exceptions. As a reminder, the exceptions to the theory 
are as follows: 
 
 Exceptions 
2002    2016 
Armenia (BOL)   Armenia (BOL) 
Azerbaijan (CFT)   Azerbaijan (BOL) 
     Azerbaijan (CFT)  BOL: 
Belarus (CFT)    Belarus (CFT)  Balance of Leadership Theory 
Georgia (BOL)   Georgia (BOL)    
Kazakhstan (CFT)   Kazakhstan (CFT)  CFT: 
Kyrgyzstan (CFT)   Kyrgyzstan (BOL) Constitutional Framework Theory 
Lithuania (CFT)   Lithuania (CFT) 
     Russia (BOL) 
     Russia (CFT) 
Tajikistan (BOL)   Tajikistan (BOL)  
 
F. CHOOSING CASE STUDIES 
Ideally, this thesis would have conducted a case study from each of the four sub-
regions described in Chapter I. Interestingly, each sub-region included an exception 
worth examining further. Had time permitted, the following case studies would have been 
chosen, and for the noted reasons: 
• Baltics: Lithuania—As the only exception to any of the factors in the 
Baltic region, this country deserves some attention. How did Lithuania 
manage to avoid the pitfalls of the mixed constitutional system and 
maintain such high levels of democratic success? Could the role of the 
president in the Lithuanian system be constrained by constitutional 
means? Does the amount of presidential political power serve as the key 
distinction, not only in mixed systems, but in presidential ones as well? In 
either case, of the three Baltic states, Lithuania was the only exception, 
and therefore the best case study option.  
• Caucasus: Azerbaijan—Of all the regions, the Caucasus seemed the least 
likely to resemble the expected results from the Theories or the 
Combination Hypothesis. While Armenia and Georgia failed to reach the 
democratic levels expected in light of their leadership balance, they fared 
better in regard to the Constitutional Framework Theory. Azerbaijan, on 
the other hand, had far less success. Failing to perform in accordance with 
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either theory, Azerbaijan continues to demonstrate levels of democratic 
practice below expectations. Like Russia, to be discussed shortly, 
Azerbaijan seems to have unique circumstances that undermine its efforts 
to pursue democracy success. Azerbaijan and Russia act as the only dual-
exception countries in this framework of analysis based on 2016 data. 
• Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan—Overall, the Central Asian countries offer 
little hope when it pertains to establishing and maintaining democratic 
freedoms. They are the lowest performers on the democratic freedom 
scale, with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan. Despite its modest size 
and economic shortcomings, Kyrgyzstan’s democratic standing appears to 
have improved since transition. What accounts for its relative success and 
recent democratic development? Is the key factor its mixed constitutional 
framework? Why has the initial leadership imbalance favoring the ancien 
régime failed to weigh down Kyrgyzstan’s democracy?  
• Eastern Europe: Russia—The inability to forecast Russia’s current 
levels of democratic freedom—by the Balance of Leadership Theory, the 
Constitutional Framework Theory, or the Combination Hypothesis—
makes Russia one of the most significant exceptional cases in this study. 
Somehow, despite the relative balance of power among the early leaders, 
and the mixed constitutional framework, Russia has defied both factors to 
develop a government that grows increasingly dictatorial, rather than one 
that oscillates between the two extremes or becomes more democratic. 
Unfortunately, space does not permit an examination of one post-Soviet republic 
from each region. For that reason, two countries have been selected, Kyrgyzstan and 
Russia. The two countries emerged from different contexts, one (Kyrgyzstan) with an 
internal power imbalance that gave the previous elites more influence in the new regime, 
while the other (Russia) struggled with a balance of power that was comparatively even 
between the old regime and the democratic challengers. Unexpectedly, the political 
leaders that had to overcome the dictatorial imbalance in Kyrgyzstan managed to do so, 
achieving higher levels of democracy than expected. Conversely, despite the theoretical 
predictions, the country with a more equal internal power balance, Russia, lost 
democratic practices over time, developing a regime that grows increasingly overbearing 
and less democratic. Azerbaijan and Russia were the two cases that defied both the 
Balance of Leadership and Constitutional Framework Theories in 2016, and these two 
countries showed downward, or increasingly dictatorial, trends. Kyrgyzstan was chosen 
for a case study instead of Azerbaijan in order to examine a country that performed better 
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than anticipated. Therefore, based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, the 
remainder of this thesis examines the development of the political circumstances in 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia to see if a more historical approach can provide a greater 
understanding of the post-Soviet experiences with democratic reform.  
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V. CASE STUDY—RUSSIA 
The post-Soviet period has had a Dickensian flavour for Russia—it has 
been the worst of times, followed by better times. 
—Journalist Justin Burke87 
 
The Russian case study examined at the particulars of the Russian transition and 
initial conditions following independence in 1991 to determine why the country defied 
both the Balance of Leadership Theory and the Constitutional Framework Theory (and 
therefore the Combination Hypothesis). Despite having a balance within the leadership at 
the point of transition, as well as initially creating a mixed constitutional framework, 
Russian democracy never fully materialized and has moved continuously towards full-
fledged dictatorship since independence. This analysis focuses on the leadership 
composition directly after the transition, mainly in 1991–1993, and how those elites 
influenced the enactment of the initial constitution. While the implications of these 
factors are discussed, particularly in the context of McFaul’s 2002 assessment and 
Russia’s current level of democratic development, a detailed discussion of Russian 
politics from 1994 through 2016 is not the focus of this analysis.  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND KEY EVENTS 
Many factors contributed to the transition of the consolidated Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics into 15 separate sovereign nations, but Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
introduction of semi-competitive elections surely played an important role.88 Rather than 
attempting to democratize the country, Gorbachev’s elections were designed to purge the 
conservative ranks of the Communist Party in order to further reform state institutions, 
                                                 
87 Justin Burke, “Post-Soviet World: What You Need to Know about the 15 States,” Guardian, June 9, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-profiles-post-soviet-states.  
88 Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms 1985–1990 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1991), 134. 
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and promote economic change through the policies of glasnost and perestroika.89 Using 
elections as a political weapon, Gorbachev managed to get himself elected as the 
chairman of the Congress and president of the Soviet Union, and was poised to execute 
his desired reforms. Unfortunately for him, the elections also created an “explosion of 
grassroots political activity throughout Russia” that unleashed opposition to his power.90 
As a result, “two main camps,” the democrats and the communists, began to vie for 
power in the Soviet Union.91  
As part of this power struggle, the leader of the democrats, Boris Yeltsin (a 
former Politburo candidate member) opposed the status quo of the ancien régime and 
orchestrated the development of the Democratic Russia party.92 The electoral success of 
Democratic Russia in the 1989 and 1990 elections caused disunity within the Soviet 
Union and prompted many of the supreme soviets, including the Russian Congress of 
People’s Deputies, to declare independence from the USSR.93 This growing division, 
combined with the Russian presidential election in June 1991, led conservatives in the 
Soviet government to attempt a power seizure through a coup in August 1991.94 The 
failure of the effort solidified Yeltsin’s influence and ultimately helped precipitate the 
end of the Soviet Union in December 1991.95  
                                                 
89 Gyula Jozsa, “The Heart of Gorbachev’s Reform Package: Rebuilding the Party Apparatus,” in The 
Soviet Union 1998–1989: Perestroika in Crisis?, ed. The Federal Institute for Soviet and International 
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90 Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, “Chapter 2: Elections,” in Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, ed. Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei 
Ryabov (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 30.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press), 38.  
93 McFaul and Petrov, “Chapter 2: Elections,” 31.  
94 John B. Dunlop, “Anatomy of a Failed Coup,” in The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse, ed. 
Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 595.  
95 Thomas M. Nichols, The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), 21–42; Timothy J. Colton, “Chapter 1: Politics,” in After the Soviet Union, ed. 
Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 19–21. 
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Due in part to continued power struggles among the elites, this time between 
factions in the newly empowered democrats, Yeltsin postponed key political actions 
when he assumed power.96 Yeltsin, 
in December 1991 dissolved the USSR. But he did not push for 
ratification of a new constitution even though he had a draft in hand, and 
he refrained from convoking a post-communist founding election. Instead, 
Yeltsin and his new government used their political mandate to initiate 
economic transformation.97 
Yeltsin’s decision to focus on economic issues rather than political reform meant that he 
failed to secure a new electoral mandate to rule after the end of the USSR, and failed to 
enact a popularly supported constitution that outlined the “rules of the game.”98 Instead, 
the existing constitution, a legacy document from the Soviet days, left ambiguity and 
confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the parliament and the president.99  
As a result, both Yeltsin and the Congress attempted to use elections and 
referendums to solidify their power, particularly the referendum in April 1993.100 While 
Yeltsin won this referendum over the anti-Yeltsin coalition, the results were not 
definitive enough to end the political stalemate that faced the governing elites. In an 
attempt to increase his relative influence, Yeltsin chose to use Presidential Decree 1400 
to dissolve the Russian Congress in September 1993 and call for a referendum in order to 
adopt a new constitution.101 Congress reacted by impeaching Yeltsin and making his vice 
president, Aleksandr Rutskoi, the new president.102 In response, as in August 1991, 
Yeltsin looked to the use of force to further his political ambitions. In contrast with the 
failed coup of 1991, however, Yeltsin and his supporters emerged victorious in October 
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1993, successfully using the military to secure their position.103 Yeltsin capitalized on the 
momentum gained from his actions to ensure approval for his preferred version of the 
constitution in December 1993.104  
As Vladimir Gel’man and other authors argue, the foundation laid down by the 
Yeltsin coalition’s constitution had a profound impact on the Russian state, particularly in 
regard to institutions.105 Yeltsin, however, was unable to capitalize fully on this success. 
His presidential power was still constrained in a number of ways that demonstrated his 
weakness, as well as the disunity of the opposition.106 A combination of issues, including 
the state of the economy, his health concerns, political infighting, and questions regarding 
his personal reputation, caused Yeltsin to spend most of the period from 1993 through 
1999 struggling to maintain access to power for himself and his supporters.107  
Despite these difficulties, Yeltsin managed to provide successfully for his family 
and loyal insiders by ensuring the election of a loyal bureaucrat, Vladimir Putin, who 
appeared to lack his own power base at the time, and would be dependent on Yeltsin’s 
network to maintain power.108 Yeltsin resigned as president in December 1999, in order 
to launch an earlier election cycle in March rather than June, in accordance with the 
constitutional rules. In doing so he ensured that Putin, as the prime minister, would 
become the acting president and could take advantage of the position as well as the 
timeline.109 As anticipated, Putin secured his own political mandate in the March 2000 
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elections, capitalizing on his popularity gained (in part) through his strategic use of 
crucial current events such as the Moscow bombings and the war in Chechnya.110  
Like Yeltsin, Putin initially faced political infighting and power struggles due to 
the relative balance of power among the elite interests. As his time in office progressed, 
however, Putin managed to build up a loyal coalition, of which he was the unquestioned 
leader, and he solidified his political dominance.111 He accomplished this feat through 
use of the existing institutions, elections, the appointment of loyal friends to key 
positions, and an increased role of the state apparatus.112 These tactics forced an 
“imposed consensus” on the elites, and mitigated potential threats to his power among the 
oligarchs or the regional leaders.113 Putin was so successful that he “was the only node in 
the center of the linkages: nobody else among the elite had personal influence even 
slightly comparable to that of the dominant actor.”114 Putin continued to cultivate his 
power and influence throughout the 2000s, bolstered by favorable economic conditions, 
to ensure that a Putin-led government became the only game in town.115  
Recent drops in oil prices, however, have contributed to growing economic woes 
for Putin as compared to the 2000s. In order to prevent civil discontent as a result of the 
increasingly difficult economic situation, the Kremlin has tried to manage the public 
“through the distraction of foreign interventions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. In 
addition, crackdowns on civil liberties and political freedoms have helped Putin maintain 
his hold on power, unfortunately contributing to the deteriorating levels of democracy in 
Russia.116 
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B. REVIEW OF RUSSIAN RESULTS AGAINST THE COMBINATION 
HYPOTHESIS 
The previous section explained the basic timeline and events since Russia’s 
transition from the Soviet Union into an independent state. Now, a review of Russia’s 
adherence to the theories and Combination Hypothesis sets the stage for further, and 
deeper, analysis of how Russia’s balance of leadership and chosen constitutional 
framework affected these events.  
As a review, in regard to the Balance of Leadership Theory, in 2002 Russia had a 
balance between the old regime and the reformers at transition and a “partially free” 
regime.117 With a Freedom House score of 5, Russia adhered to McFaul’s assessment. 
This Freedom House score from McFaul’s 2002 date of assessment proves higher than 
those demonstrated earlier in Russia’s post-transition evolution. Table 12 shows Russia’s 
Freedom House scores since 1991. 
Table 12.   Freedom House Scores for Russia—1991–2016118 
 
As the table shows, by 2016, however, Russia’s situation no longer appeared 
consistent with McFaul’s results, as the state had regressed into a full-blown “not free” 
country, with a Freedom House score of 6.  
                                                 
117 As a reminder, one of the foundational documents of this thesis, McFaul’s article, was published in 
2002 and therefore this analysis considers the political situation during 2002 throughout the analysis. The 
key dates and the reason they have been chosen are as follows: 1) 1991—date of independence, used to 
establish the initial level of democratic development, 2) 1989–1993—dates in which the initial leadership 
emerged, used to determine the leadership balance at the point of transition as well as the actions taken 
during this period to develop the initial constitution, 2) 1993—enactment of the initial constitution, used to 
determine the constitutional framework, 3) 2002—date McFaul’s article was published, the foundational 
piece of the Balance of Leadership Theory, used to evaluate McFaul’s classifications of the initial power 
balance, 4) 2016—the current levels of democracy, used to applicability of the Balance of Leadership 
Theory, Constitutional Framework Theory, and the Combination Hypothesis.  
118 Freedom House scores from 1975–2016. Adapted from “About Freedom in the World,” accessed 
April 7, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. Freedom in the World Report. 
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Similarly, Russia’s political system supported the Constitutional Framework 
Theory in 1991 and 2002 when the mixed constitutional framework aligned with its 
“partially free” status. In 2016, however, Russia’s mixed framework no longer supported 
the theory, because the theory would not have predicted the lower levels of democratic 
freedom experienced by Russia.  
If Russia adhered to both theories in 1991 and 2002, and neither in 2016, what 
accounts for the discrepancy that developed over the years? In other words, what 
accounts for the early “adherence” and the later “regression?” A deeper look at both 
factors, the balance of leadership and the constitutional framework, will address the 
following to determine what the Russian case study says about the Balance of Leadership 
Theory, the Constitutional Framework Theory, and the Combination Hypothesis:  
• What was the power balance of the Russian leadership at transition (1991–
1993)? Was McFaul’s assessment in 2002 correct? 
• Does this power balance explain why Russian democracy was consistent 
with the Balance of Leadership Theory in 2002, but not in 2016? 
• What type of constitutional framework did the elites develop in the initial 
Russian constitution of 1993? Does this constitutional framework match 
the classification found in the scholarly literature discussed in Chapter III? 
• Does the constitutional framework chosen explain why Russian 
democracy was consistent with the Constitutional Framework Theory in 
2002, but not in 2016? 
C. RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
The following section begins by providing the important evidence needed to 
understand the balance of power among the elites in the post-Soviet context, and uses that 
information to offer conclusions regarding the role of leadership in Russia’s democratic 
development.  
1. Evidence  
In order to assess the balance of power within Russia during the phase of 
transition, several different leadership dynamics were considered between 1989 and 1993 
(when the constitution was adopted). This analysis assumes that the leadership dynamics 
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were “in balance” when political infighting and power struggles affected the 
government’s ability to function and address needed reforms, yet no clear leader 
emerged, and the institutions were unable to deal with the stalemate. Several groups fit 
this definition in 1989–1993, particularly when taking into consideration Russia’s unique 
transition from the USSR. The research shows that, regardless of the group considered, 
during this time a balance existed between the relevant elites except in two main 
instances. Both periods of imbalance were brief and characterized by the use of force.  
The first relevant example of elites vying for power involved the loyalists to the 
old Soviet regime and the newly established “democrats” that emerged during the late 
1980s before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While technically not the leadership 
balance at the point of transition, as this dynamic existed prior to the end of the Soviet 
Union, the impact of the power struggle between these two groups contributed to the 
existence and character of a sovereign Russia. Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov 
explain that “organizationally and ideologically, Russian politics had become polarized 
into those supporting the old order and those behind Democratic Russia.”119 Essentially, 
the power distribution was balanced between those in the Gorbachev camp who wanted 
the status quo, and those that fought against it in the Yeltsin coalition. While a balance 
existed before the attempted coup in 1991, the democrats emerged from the coup having 
temporarily seized the majority, thus solidifying their position and helping to bring down 
the Soviet regime.120  
While the democrats emerged victorious after the failed use of force, they did not 
assume their leadership role as a united front. Thus, the second relevant example of elite 
power struggle occurred at the point of transition as Russia took its first actions as a 
sovereign nation. The power struggle in 1991 was between competing interests within the 
victorious democratic coalition. Essentially, Yeltsin and the other elites that came into 
power as part of the wave of enthusiasm about democratic prospects lacked the 
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organization and ideological unity required of an “imbalance of power.” Vladimir 
Gel’man explains this disunity by describing the make-up of the winners of the coup:  
The newly emerged winning coalition around Boris Yeltsin in 1990-1991 
was largely ad hoc and based upon a negative consensus against the 
previous status quo and the Soviet rulers led by Gorbachev. It involved 
market-oriented liberals, anti-Communists who often called themselves 
‘democrats’ but also shared Sobchak’s notions (‘we are in power; that is 
democracy’), rent-seekers from various interest groups, and some officials 
who shifted their preferences toward the new winners at the right time.121  
Thus, within the “democrats,” a group united only in its stance against the status 
quo, factions arose once the coalition had wrested power from the ancien régime and 
created another unstable balance of power between elites. Once more, as Gel’man 
explains, “the allies (if not friends) of August 1991 turned into mortal enemies as early as 
1992.” As a result, the coalition of “democrats” proved volatile at best.122 Yeltsin was 
popular among the Russian public directly following the coup, but his power within elite 
circles was not sufficient to make his leadership unassailable, particularly in regard to his 
dealings with the legislature.123  
As a result of this power struggle between Yeltsin and the legislature, the elites 
spent a great deal of effort between December 1991 and October 1993 creating coalitions 
and finding ways to increase their power.124 This represents the third example of an elite 
power balance. Much of this infighting pitted Yeltsin and his loyalists against the elites in 
parliament, taking a significant amount of their time and attention.125 “The winning 
coalition around Yeltsin in October 1991 had no incentives for building democracy,” 
Gel’man argues, “not because of their personal stances but because of the lack of rational 
motivation to risk voluntarily losing power.”126 Essentially, the elites were so focused on 
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keeping their access to power, since they still considered it uncertain, that they neglected 
democracy and failed to agree regarding the future of reforms.  
Tensions continued to rise, and Yeltsin found himself clashing with the Congress 
of People’s Deputies in 1992 over the new draft of the Russian constitution and the 
selection of a prime minister, among other issues. “Political maneuvering during the 
following months of 1992,” Gel’man explains, “did not resolve the rising conflict 
between Yeltsin and the parliament, but rather exacerbated it.”127 The power struggle, 
balanced between the president and the legislature, came to a head and Congress 
scheduled a referendum for April 1993 asking for the public’s confidence in the president 
and government of Russia, and whether or not to call early elections.128  
As a result of the referendum, new founding elections became inevitable, and 
disputes over the constitution gained traction. Tension, caused in part by unresolved 
disagreements regarding the content and power distributions in the draft constitution, 
contributed to Yeltsin’s decision to launch a coup in September 1993.129 First, Yeltsin 
dissolved the parliament in September 1993, and announced new elections for December 
1993.130 The parliament, with its own sources of power, voted to impeach Yeltsin, and 
frustration grew. Rather than reaching a cooperative solution since neither group held a 
majority of the power, both groups continued to try to solidify their majority.  
When parliamentary supporters started riots during a rally in Moscow on 3 
October 1993, Yeltsin seized the moment and had army troops shell the parliament 
residence in order to force a change in power dynamics.131 According to Gel’man,  
this was a zero-sum solution to the intraelite conflict: Yeltsin and his team 
effectively eliminated their rivals, who had lacked public support; the very 
idea of executive accountability before the legislature was buried, as was 
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that of checks and balances. Yeltsin’s camp won, and used the outcomes 
of the conflict to maximize power through the unconstrained creation of 
new rules of the game.132  
In other words, rather than allowing the elites to compose the document through 
cooperation, Yeltsin waited until he had a power imbalance in his favor to move forward 
with a constitution providing for presidential dominance.133 This decision was helpful to 
Yeltsin in securing power for himself and the office of the president, but it had 
implications for Russian democracy.  
2. Conclusions 
Despite two brief periods of imbalance, Russia experienced the frustration of 
power balance throughout the majority of the 1990s. Interestingly, the two periods of 
imbalance, brought about by attempts to take power by force, created substantial change. 
The attempted coup in 1991 helped contribute to the fall of the USSR, and the military 
intervention in 1993 resulted in the approval of the constitution. After these brief 
imbalances, ultimately the power dynamics became unstable yet again. Even after Yeltsin 
managed to push the constitution through in 1993, his presidency was mired by intraelite 
competition. Winning the election in 1996 did not help matters, as Yeltsin was forced to 
create a cartel-like system to ensure loyalty among the insiders.134 Putin also dealt with 
issues of infighting, and it took him several years to consolidate power sufficiently to use 
the imbalance effectively.  
Overall, regardless of the elite dynamics considered, McFaul’s assessment as part 
of the Balance of Leadership Theory proves accurate, for the most part. Three distinct 
balanced relationships existed in the Russian experience during transition: first, the 
balance between the reformist communists aligned with Gorbachev and the democrats 
following Yeltsin; second, the balance between the different factions of elites with the 
democrats once the Soviet Union ended; and third, the balance between the Yeltsin 
coalition, centered around the office of the president, and the elites within the Russian 
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legislature. Except for two brief interludes—when Yeltsin’s power allowed him to make 
massive changes—Russian politicians failed to consolidate power and make decisive 
changes throughout the 1990s.  
Elements of the balanced stalemate appeared to keep Russia from sliding too far 
down the democratic development scale. In 1991, Russia appeared as an independent 
nation with a Freedom House score of 3, matching its emerging democratic hopes with 
the fading totalitarian legacy. Unfortunately, Russia’s Freedom House numbers 
continuously increased, albeit slowly, from 1991 onward. From 1991 to 2003, the 
leadership failed to consolidate sufficiently to either advance democratic initiatives or 
create a strong authoritarian regime, and the Freedom House numbers matched, keeping 
Russia in the “partially free” category. It was not until 2004 that Russia crossed from a 
“partially free” regime to a “not free” regime with a 5.5 on the Freedom House scale. 
Interestingly, this shift correlated with Putin’s increased power concentration as he 
entered into his second presidential term.  
The Freedom House numbers may say more about power centralization than 
about either of the theories, but the fact that in 2002 power had not yet been consolidated 
in Russia, and the country still had a “partially free” status (with a score of 5 on the 
Freedom House scale) suggests a correlation between Russia’s mid-range level of 
democracy and the balance between the elite factions. When a power balance clearly no 
longer existed in 2016, with Putin solidly in charge, Russia’s Freedom House score 
matched, coming in with a 6 on the scale.  
The deeper look into Russia’s balance of leadership shows support for McFaul’s 
theory and assessments, confirming an initial balance of leadership at transition in 1991. 
It also suggests that the balance of power between Russian elites, regardless of the time 
frame, correlates strongly with Freedom House measures of democracy—the more 
imbalance, the less democracy. 
Since power balances may change over time, the Combination Hypothesis 
suggests that the decisively important balance of power is the one that exists as the 
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founding institutions, or constitutional frameworks, are formed. The next section 
examines the constitutional framework that Russia created.  
D. RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
The following section begins by providing the important evidence needed to 
define the type of constitution developed in the post-Soviet content, and uses that 
information to offer conclusions regarding the role of constitutional framework in 
Russia’s democratic development.  
1. Evidence 
The previous section confirmed that the power dynamics among Russian leaders 
at the point of transition in 1991 was balanced, yet ineffectual, as power competition 
remained the elites’ primary focus, rather than policy development or reform.135 
Yeltsin’s ability to solidify his influence after military action in 1993 created a brief 
imbalance that allowed a limited group of individuals to control the political situation at 
the point of constitutional transition. The following paragraphs outline the type of 
constitution that had been developing prior to 1993, and the version that emerged as a 
result of the imbalance in 1993. This analysis also assesses the approved version of the 
constitution against Krouwel’s criteria mentioned in Chapter III.136  
While many of the elites focused their efforts on winning elections and 
consolidating power in 1991–1993, a special group was tasked to modify the acting 
constitution of 1990.137 This provisional constitution was based on the 1978 Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Constitution, and was an “offspring of the 
1977 USSR ‘Brezhnev’ Constitution.”138 In order to further that effort, the Congress of 
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People’s Deputies created the Constitutional Commission in 1990. Although 
commissioned under the Soviet Union, interestingly, the group had several 
democratically minded individuals that contributed substantially to the project. According 
to Viktor Sheinis, a member of the commission, “several of the deputies, and additional 
expert lawyers brought into the working group who were well known for their consistent 
democratic stance—altogether some 15 to 20 people—carried out the real development 
of the text of the new constitution.”139 Even with a democratic influence, however, 
debate over the constitutional framework ensued. In fact, from the beginning two 
differing mindsets emerged regarding the fundamentals of the constitution. 
These approaches were so different, Sheinis reports that their drafts had to be 
presented separately.140 The first approach was labeled the “president as head of 
executive branch approach” and was supported by a majority of the working group.141 
Sheinis offers the following details:  
According to this approach, the president would head the government as 
well as form and lead the apparatus of the federal executive branch. This 
version did not foresee an office of chair of government, and gave the 
president the right to nominate ministers, whose appointment—but not 
removal—would be subject to parliamentary approval. This version did 
not mention the government and placed its functions in the category of 
presidential powers.142  
Essentially, this approach promoted a highly presidential version of the constitution, one 
that “eschewed not only the parliamentary, but also the semipresidential” model as well.143  
Conversely, Viktor Sheinis and others promoted a version that balanced power 
between the legislature and the president more evenly, which they called the 
“government accountable to parliament approach.”144 This version was designed to limit 
the president’s role by having the lower house of the parliament approve the chief 
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executive’s nomination for the head of government, confirm the mandate to form the 
government, take votes of confidence/no confidence in the government, as well as force 
the government’s resignation.145 Importantly, this version ensured that the rules allowing 
for a greater balance and separation of powers would be outlined in the constitution.  
As mentioned, despite the upswing in democratic support that occurred in 1991, 
Russia failed to enact a democratic constitution. The longer the debate over the content of 
the constitution continued, the more “eclectic and compromise-ridden” the draft became, 
as each side worked to determine the relative roles of the president and the parliament.146 
The languishing draft emerged alongside the continued power struggle among the elites, 
but failed to solidify during the stalemate.  
As the debates between Yeltsin and the Congress continued, the advancements 
made through compromise in the Constitutional Commission waned and conflict broke 
out.147 The dispute seemed to come to a head in 1993 when a “deep constitutional crisis 
ensued.”148 Many in the Congress were unwilling to make changes to the status quo, and 
risk their own political stability, so they therefore clung to the composite, yet safe, 
makeshift version of a new constitution that had been cobbled together.  
The problems in reaching consensus became moot, however, when the game changed 
dramatically with President Yeltsin’s consolidation of power following the 1993 
referendum.149 The shift in power also represented a change in direction in regard to the 
constitutional development.150 Viktor Sheinis explains this shift, noting that despite the work 
and effort conducted for years leading up to the events of 1993 the following occurred:  
Launching the game preemptively, the president presented the new draft 
constitution immediately after his victory in the referendum. This was a 
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significant move. As the chairman of the Constitutional Commission, the 
president disavowed the draft that the commission’s working group had 
prepared and the Congress’s conservative majority had amended, and 
produced a new draft.151  
Deviating from the tirelessly constructed agreements of the preceding years, the 
“presidential” draft was published on 30 April 1993.152 On the plus side, the draft offered 
clarity on a number of disputed issues, but overall, Yeltsin’s draft proposed reducing the 
political power of the parliament and increasing the executive’s ability to introduce 
critical laws regarding taxes, loans, and the state budget.153 In addition, the April 1993 
draft increased the power of the president significantly, particularly in regard to power 
over the parliament and the issuance of political decrees and executive orders.154  
A newly convened Constitutional Assembly worked to consolidate the 30 April 1993 
draft with the previous version from the Constitutional Commission. The Assembly did not 
get a chance to unveil the combined draft, however, before Yeltsin’s attempts to dissolve 
parliament in September 1993 and the resulting military action of October 1993.155 
Therefore, as Sheinis observes, “Yeltsin’s forceful victory over the Congress in the autumn 
of 1993 created a new balance of political forces in Moscow, one that was entirely in the 
president’s favor. It was these events that produced the December 1993 constitution and 
Russia’s super-presidential system,” and made any cooperative version obsolete.156  
The coup in October 1993 may prove to be one of the most crucial points in 
Russia’s democratic development. As a result of this victory, Yeltsin consolidated his 
power enough to push through his draft constitution in December 1993. McFaul and 
Petrov explain the importance of Yeltsin’s actions following his consolidation of power 
after the October coup: “After Yeltsin’s successful use of force against the Congress…the 
president used his unquestioned power to dictate the new rules of the game…not 
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surprisingly, the new draft constitution gave the president extraordinary powers, 
compelling some to label the regime a super-presidential system.”157 In assessing 
Yeltsin’s “presidential” version, as Chapter III explained, the relative balance of the 
presidential power is only one factor in understanding constitutional frameworks.  
Essentially, regardless of the president-centric constitution Russia adopted once 
Yeltsin briefly consolidated power in October 1993, Russia’s constitutional framework 
cannot necessarily be described as presidential simply by examining the power of the 
president. Theoretically, countries with strong presidents (such as France and the United 
States) can still have mixed systems as a result of other constitutionally established 
institutions that help balance executive power with the other branches.158 It is noteworthy 
that some scholars did not view the Russian constitution as super-presidential. For instance, 
when reviewing the 1993 document, (Thomas) “Remington provides a more balanced 
assessment: ‘Using a typology proposed by political scientists Matthew Shugart and John 
Carey, we can call the Russian system ‘presidential-parliamentary’” or a mixed system.159  
In order to evaluate the Russian constitution more fully, the criteria outlined by 
Krouwel in Chapter III can be used to examine the 1993 constitution across seven 
dimensions to determine the presidential, parliamentary, or mixed nature of the document.160 
While Krouwel is not the only scholar to suggest that Russia’s constitutional framework from 
1993 can be characterized as mixed, his robust system of categorization and measurement 
offers a detailed explanation of how to reach that conclusion. Unlike many scholars, Krouwel 
provides a system of measurements that consider a country’s level of presidentialism as well 
as parliamentarianism.161 In his work, each constitution is measured on a spectrum, rather 
than being placed in an absolute category based on the dichotomy between presidentialism 
and parliamentarianism.162  
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According to Krouwel’s analysis of twelve Central and East European countries, 
Russia has the highest score in terms of constitutionally presidential characteristics and 
the lowest in terms of parliamentary attributes.163 Krouwel spends a great deal of time 
outlining the “core dimensions” that determine the “core characteristics” of each 
constitutional framework.164 Using data from a variety of sources, Table 13 offers an 
assessment of Russia in relation to Krouwel’s core characteristics.  
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As Table 13 indicates, Russia falls mostly into the presidential and mixed side of 
the measurements. Of the seven indicators, Russia has five more “presidential” 
characteristics, two “mixed” tendencies, and no purely “parliamentary” leanings. In fact, 
Krouwel often points out the uniqueness of Russia’s constitution as compared to the 
eleven other countries in his study based on the number of presidential characteristics 
Russia exhibits. He notes, “In one state (the Russian Federation) the level of 
presidentialism reaches almost the maximum score.”165 This characterization is not 
denoting the relative level of presidential power in comparison to the legislature (while 
the two might be related), but instead indicates that the constitutional framework that 
Yeltsin and his supporters chose to develop legally enshrines powers typical of a 
presidential system. The following explanations helped develop Table 13. In many cases 
the Russian constitution had elements of a presidential framework, with elements of 
balanced (mixed) power dynamics, or conversely, a mixed framework, with a presidential 
power imbalance. In these cases, the blurring of the lines was apparent. Essentially, 
Russia demonstrates (mostly) presidentialism in the following ways:  
• (Head of State Elections) The president is directly elected vice indirectly 
elected by the government. The president appoints head of the government 
with consent from the legislature. This arrangement is more presidential 
than mixed because the Duma can reject the nomination for the chairman 
of the government, but if it does so three times, the president can dissolve 
the Duma and call for new elections.166 
• (Dissolution of the Government) Aside from the example just mentioned, 
the Russian constitution places the ability to dissolve the Duma with the 
president according to Article 84, which states: “The President of the 
Russian Federation shall dissolve the State Duma in cases and according 
to the rules fixed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” The rules 
apply to votes of investiture and no confidence, discussed in the following 
paragraphs. Russia is not considered mixed in this regard because while 
the head of government or the Duma may begin the process to dismiss the 
parliament or government, the decision ultimately comes back to the 
president.167  
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• (Legislative Powers) The president can introduce legislation according to 
Article 104, or as Levent Gonenç explains, “Presidents serving under 
President-parliamentary constitutions, like those serving under pure-
presidential constitutions, have significant legislative powers.”168 The 
wide political purview of the president makes this aspect more presidential 
than mixed. Additionally, the president can veto the legislation initiated by 
the government.  
• (Executive Powers) The constitutional right for the president to issue 
decrees and orders is documented in Article 90 of the constitution, which 
also extends the scope of the executive’s power. 169  
• (No Confidence) Votes of no confidence may be initiated either by the 
State Duma to the Government of Russia, or by the Chairman of the 
Government to the Duma. What makes this process presidential is that 
when a majority of votes is reached by the Duma, the President can either 
announce the resignation of the government or reject the decision of the 
Duma. If this happens again within three months, the President must then 
decide to either dismiss the government or dissolve the parliament. 
Likewise, if the Government presents a no confidence motion to the 
Duma, and the Duma agrees, again the President must decide to either 
relieve the government, or dissolve the Duma and call for new 
elections.170 Ultimately, the process involves both the 
legislature/government and the chief executive, but the chief executive 
always decides, and the burden of risk is taken by the 
legislature/government.171 
Russia demonstrates a mostly mixed framework in the following ways:  
• (Appointing Cabinet and Ministers) Krouwel explains the dynamics in 
Russia by stating that “the power to appoint ministers (including the prime 
minister) and influence the individual ministerial portfolio allocation 
and/or party composition of the government” was split between the 
president and the parliament. Russia’s case is unique in another way, 
however: if the parliament votes no on the president’s candidate for prime 
minister three times, the president can dissolve the legislature and call for 
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new elections.172 This demonstrates a mixed framework, with a slight 
power imbalance towards the president.  
• (Responsibility to the Parliament/Vote of Investiture) Krouwel specifically 
states, “In Russia, the president can ignore the loss of a vote of 
investiture,” but Gonenç explains further: “While the Cabinet usually 
needs the confirmation of the Assembly of its composition, the President 
has the right to appoint the Prime Minister…(with the consent of the 
Parliament) and Cabinet ministers (upon the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister).”173 In other words, in the Russian system; since the President 
appoints directly and indirectly the head of the government and the 
cabinet, the vote of investiture is less important. This is regarded as a 
mixed structure, since both the legislature and the executive participate. 
Since the president can dissolve the Duma, however, if his nominee for 
prime minister is not accepted, this borders on presidential.  
2. Conclusions 
Overall, the constitution draft approved in 1993 had a mixed framework 
dominated by presidential characteristics. As the research shows, pieces of the mixed 
framework exist within a mostly presidential structure, with very few parliamentary 
influences working to prevent a power concentration in the office of the president. The 
timing and method Yeltsin chose to bring the constitution into effect indicates that the 
balance of power among the elites was solely with the president when the constitution 
was approved.174 In other words, Yeltsin was not forced to collaborate with other 
factions to develop a different, perhaps more balanced, form of constitutional framework 
outlining governmental institutions like the ones that had been under development in 
1990–1993.175 In essence, Yeltsin used the power imbalance he created through political 
and military action to force through a constitution more suited to his priorities, rather than 
working through the Constitutional Commission’s consensus.  
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The fact that the 1993 constitution was adopted, giving a great deal of power to 
the president, may explain how both Yeltsin and Putin were successful in using the 
institutions in order to rule by decree and solidify power through constitutionally legal 
methods.176 Since the institutions were developed intentionally by Yeltsin to favor the 
office of the president, rather than through a cooperative effort, the framework appears 
greatly susceptible to executive influence. Tellingly, neither president felt the need to 
change significantly the constitution during his terms in office, perhaps because they 
benefited substantially from its provisions.  
Had the original constitution been developed during any of the periods in which 
the president was constrained by the balance of power with his competitors, perhaps a 
compromise constitution might have emerged that was less beneficial to the executive. 
Much of the work to develop a compromise (because of the power balance) occurred 
between 1990 and 1993, as just described in the previous section. Instead, the constitution 
created when Yeltsin was politically powerful ended up being one with a mixed 
framework, notable for its strong presidential components, which has arguably 
contributed to Russia’s difficulty in achieving greater democratic development.  
In addition, the ability of the executive to take advantage of the constitution may 
help explain why Russia failed to adhere to the Constitutional Framework Theory in 
2016. Essentially, the constitution was ripe for presidential exploitation since its 
inception in 1993, but it was not until Putin managed to centralize his power starting 
roughly in 2004 that the document was utilized more fully. Arguably, had Yeltsin been 
politically stronger in the late 1990s (or perhaps had other political circumstances been 
different), he would have taken his constitutionally mandated power further. Conversely, 
had a compromise constitution developed in 1993, the document might have created 
more institutions to constrain the chief executive, perhaps even Putin. 
Since the constitutional framework did not change significantly over the years, the 
Constitutional Framework Theory does not explain Russia’s declining Freedom House 
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numbers. Instead, the mixed system offered neither the right balance to constrain the 
executive nor the capacity to nudge the country towards higher levels of democratic 
freedoms. Perhaps the mixed framework offers the best mirror for the leadership: if the 
leaders are democratic, a mixed framework can help distribute power to different 
branches of government and support democracy, but if the leaders are authoritarian, the 
mixed framework can be used to further power centralization and lower political 
freedoms.  
E. SUMMATION—CONSIDERING THE COMBINATION HYPOTHESIS  
The Combination Hypothesis suggests that the initial balance of leadership is 
crucial because this balance helps determine the makeup of the elite group that creates the 
constitutional framework. Essentially, the critical link is between the elites at transition 
and the constitution they develop. In that regard, Russia meets the requirements of the 
Balance of Leadership Theory, the Constitutional Framework Theory, and the 
Combination Hypothesis in unexpected ways. First, since the elites loyal to Yeltsin 
waited until they had a favorable power imbalance before revealing their constitutional 
framework, they ensured the adoption of the version that politically benefitted the office 
of the president. In essence, McFaul was right about his balance categorization in that it 
benefitted the non-democrats and has led to an authoritarian regime. He simply 
emphasized the wrong time. The elites were balanced when a sovereign Russia was 
created in 1991, but that was not the crucial point in Russia’s political development. 
Rather, when the power was imbalanced towards the non-democratic leaders at the point 
of constitutional transition, the important institutions were developed. 
These institutions support the Constitutional Framework Theory and the 
Combination Hypothesis in a second unexpected way. Even though technically the 
constitutional framework was mixed, its strong presidential character and the method by 
which it was adopted make it understandably conducive of authoritarianism. In that way, 
Stepan and Skach were correct in holding constitutional framework mattered.177  
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Overall, Russia can be seen as consistent with the Combination Hypothesis in that 
Russia’s imbalanced “balance of leadership” at the point of constitutional transition 
created a constitutional framework with a strong presidential character. It is completely 
understandable that a “not free” regime (to use the Freedom House classification) would 
develop out of a framework that constitutionally centralizes so much unrestricted power 
in the office of the president. 
 79 
VI. CASE STUDY—KYRGYZSTAN 
Having acquired independence Kyrgyzstan very quickly gained a 
reputation as an ‘island of democracy’ located in a sea of dictatorships and 
countries ravaged by civil strife. 
—John Anderson178 
 
The case study for Kyrgyzstan will follow the same format as the Russian version. 
Again, the emphasis will be on the elite dynamics when Kyrgyzstan set out as an 
independent state, and the initial constitution. As with Russia, the most relevant events 
occurred between 1989 and 1993.  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND KEY EVENTS 
Kyrgyzstan’s transition from a republic in the Soviet empire to an independent 
state developed tumultuously, combining political, economic, and nationalist issues. 
Politically, Askar Akaev had been selected to the presidency of the Supreme Soviet in 
1990, when the previous leader, Absamat Masaliyev, had been discredited by his 
perceived mishandling of the clash between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the 
southern city of Osh.179 Part of Akaev’s appeal to the Soviet leadership, particularly to 
Gorbachev, was his intellectual background as a physicist and his reformist mentality.180 
Seen as an outsider, Akaev was chosen as a compromise figure by the Party elites, and 
found himself the head of state before Kyrgyzstan declared its independence in August 
1991 and before the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991.181 In fact, President 
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Akaev had already faced public elections once, in October 1991, by the time Kyrgyzstan 
officially became an independent state.182  
Although Kyrgyzstan did not have to begin its newly acquired independence with 
a leadership void or a power struggle, having recently reaffirmed Akaev’s mandate in 
October 1991 and the legislature’s in February 1990, the transition from status as a 
republic within the Soviet Union to that of an independent state was not without 
difficulties.183 As with many of the post-Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan was plagued with 
economic hardships and an uncertain political situation early in its transition.184 Some 
leaders worried that the “reduction in central involvement” by the Soviet Union 
“exacerbated existing problems” and that the new government would have difficulty 
transitioning.185 To complicate the situation, Kyrgyzstan as a multi-national state faced 
growing tensions between ethnic and tribal groups within its borders.186 These divisions, 
sometimes exploited for political gain, were often split along north-south lines, between 
Kyrgyz and non-Kyrgyz speakers, and against the substantial Russian population.187  
The new government confronting these challenges consisted of Akaev as the 
president and most of the former Soviet insiders now holding positions in the 
legislature.188 Between the president and parliament, one of the major concerns facing 
the governing elites during the early years was the development of a new constitution.189 
The composition of the new constitution required significant discussion and coordination 
between the different players, but it was finally approved on 5 May 1993.190  
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Despite the success of enacting a constitution, Akaev grew frustrated with what 
he saw as the ineptitude and desire for power displayed by the parliamentary deputies.191 
Although he was initially celebrated as a democratic and market reformer, Akaev tried to 
address his issues with the parliament by increasing his relative power through 
referendums and amendments to the constitution.192 Akaev pushed for major 
constitutional changes in 1996 that significantly increased the powers of the president 
compared to the legislature and oversaw another round of changes in 2003 that attempted 
to mitigate the power centralization of the 1996 version.193  
Akaev, who was overthrown in the March-April 2005 Tulip Revolution, was not 
the only chief executive who saw constitutional change. Overall, Kyrgyzstan held 
numerous referendums since independence and significantly amended the constitution at 
least three other times in 2006, 2007, and 2010.194 The debates that precipitated the 
constitutional changes revolved mainly around power dynamics between the two power 
centers, the president and the legislature. Essentially, the post-Akaev constitutional 
changes in 2006 and 2010 worked to undo the legal power centralization Akaev achieved, 
while the changes in 2007 attempted to reinstate it.195 Thus, the current version of 
Kyrgyzstan’s constitution is the product of a number of substantive alterations enacted 
since independence.  
Aside from the constitutional debate, throughout the initial period and much of 
Kyrgyzstan’s history as an independent country, accusations of corruption were traded 
between the president, his loyalists, and members of the legislature, often affecting 
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government effectiveness and objectivity.196 At times the corruption and infighting led to 
uprisings and demonstrations from a disconcerted public.197 From the big protests that 
led to changes of leadership such as the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and a similar regime 
change in 2010, to the smaller showings of nationalism or distrust in the government 
experienced on a more regular basis, Kyrgyzstan contended with a disgruntled populace 
on a number of important occasions.198 Civil society in Kyrgyzstan, often a key factor in 
political events, demonstrated substantial organization and party activity as early as 1990 
when the old nomenklatura recognized the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DMK) 
as a legitimate political movement.199  
The relatively active civil society has helped the government of Kyrgyzstan turn 
over power more frequently than some of the other post-Soviet republics, particularly the 
other Central Asian countries.200 For instance, Akaev was removed from power in 2005 
during the Tulip Revolution when he fled the country in response to the public 
pressure.201 His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who also abused the power of the 
presidency during his tenure, was similarly ousted by popular demand in 2010.202 Since 
Akaev, Kyrgyzstan has had three presidents (including Bakiyev) and the parliament has 
held at least five elections since independence.203 The current president, Almazbek 
Atambayev, has been in office since 2011, and the current parliament since October 
2015.204  
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B. REVIEW OF KYRGYZSTAN’S RESULTS AGAINST THE 
COMBINATION HYPOTHESIS 
As with Russia, Kyrgyzstan will be evaluated against the Balance of Leadership 
Theory, the Constitutional Framework Theory, and the Combination Hypothesis using 
Freedom House scores from 2002, the date of McFaul’s article, and the most recent 
scores from 2016.205 To review, in regard to the Balance of Leadership Theory, McFaul 
in his 2002 article classified Kyrgyzstan’s post-transition situation as one with a 
leadership imbalance towards the old regime. This characterization was consistent with 
the “not free” status given by Freedom House and its 5.5 score at the time, however, 
proves higher than the 4.5 score Kyrgyzstan had in 1991. Therefore, unlike Russia’s 
experiences with the Balance of Leadership Theory, Kyrgyzstan did not appear consistent 
with the theory in both 1991 and 2002.206  
In regard to the Constitutional Framework Theory, the mixed constitutional 
framework did not align with the Constitutional Framework Theory during the same 
period (2002), as Kyrgyzstan’s Freedom House scores were lower in 2002 than the theory 
would predict. By 2016, as with 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s increase in democratic freedom, 
albeit by just half of a point, and corresponding “partially free” status, put the country at 
odds with the Balance of Leadership Theory and consistent with the Constitutional 
Framework Theory.207 Essentially Kyrgyzstan’s apparent conformity to the theories 
switched between 1991, 2002, and 2016. What accounts for these reversals?  
As with Russia, a deeper look at both factors, the balance of leadership and the 
constitutional framework, will address the following questions to determine what the 
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Kyrgyz case study says about the Balance of Leadership Theory, Constitutional 
Framework Theory, and the Combination Hypothesis:  
• What was the power balance of the leadership in Kyrgyzstan at the point 
of transition (1991)? Was McFaul’s assessment in 2002 correct? 
• Does this power balance explain why Kyrgyzstan’s level of democracy 
was consistent with the Balance of Leadership Theory in 2002, but not in 
2016? 
• What type of constitutional framework did the elites develop in 
Kyrgyzstan’s initial constitution of 1993? Does this constitutional 
framework match the classification found in the scholarly literature 
discussed in Chapter III? 
• Does the constitutional framework chosen explain why Kyrgyz democracy 
was consistent with the Constitutional Framework Theory in 2016, but not 
in 2002? 
A note about Freedom House scores: Kyrgyzstan’s Freedom House scores have 
fluctuated much more than Russia’s.208 As mentioned in Chapter V, Russia’s have scores 
dropped continuously since 1991. Table 12 is reshown here:209 
 
Freedom House Scores for Russia—1991–2016 
 
 
Russia’s scores appear to line up consistently with notable historical events and 
political dynamics. Looking at just one instance, from 1999 forward, for example, Putin’s 
growing power concentration allowed him to use more and more of the institutional 
frameworks to his benefit, and the levels of Russian democracy fell accordingly. While 
this is just one example, a general trend emerges.  
Kyrgyzstan’s scores, on the other hand, show a different story, one that alludes to 
a more volatile history, as the changes in Kyrgyzstan’s democratic levels were far from 
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smooth and consistent like Russia’s.210 Instead, Kyrgyzstan’s democratic levels moved 
between the “partially free” and “not free” zones and from scores between 3 and 5.5 
throughout its post-independence history.211 Table 14 shows the fluctuations. 
Table 14.   Freedom House Scores for Kyrgyzstan—1991–2016212 
 
 
A number of factors contributed to the changing Freedom House evaluations, so 
the remainder of the case study considers if the balance of the leadership or the 
constitutional framework had an impact on these scores.  
C. LEADERSHIP IN KYRGYZSTAN DURING THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
The following section begins by providing the important evidence needed to 
understand the balance of power among the elites in the post-Soviet context, and uses that 
information to offer conclusions regarding the role of leadership in Kyrgyzstan’s 
democratic development.  
1. Evidence  
As mentioned, a certain amount of upheaval occurred prior to the election of 
Askar Akaev as the first executive president of Kyrgyzstan in 1990.213 The Chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet at the time, Absamat Masaliyev, seemed the natural nominee until his 
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response to the events in Osh discredited him.214 The agreed upon substitute, Akaev, 
served as the unexpected compromise candidate who appeared less threatening to the 
more established, status quo elites. In reality, while Akaev was a member of the 
Communist Party, he was not a party insider, having spent most of his career as a 
scientist.215 In addition, unlike many insiders, Akaev was dedicated to reforming the 
system.216 In part for this reason, Akaev faced an attempted coup like his fellow 
reformer,  Gorbachev, , also in August 1991.217 Akaev survived the coup attempt and 
continued his efforts to reform Kyrgyzstan as an independent state. John Anderson 
describes Akaev’s early political ideology as follows:  
In subsequent speeches Akaev made frequent references to the need for 
marketisation and democratisation to move forward together and, 
following his selection as president, he showed his openness to newly 
emerging social forces by meeting with representatives of various groups 
that had been picketing the parliamentary gathering and then holding a 
series of meetings with leaders of informal societal organisations.218 
As expected, Akaev’s behavior and position on reform conflicted with the views of the 
other hold-over elites from the Soviet era.219 
This disagreement over fundamental policy objectives between Akaev and the 
other former Soviet leaders illustrates that the elite power was actually fairly balanced in 
the initial post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Anderson explains the situation Akaev faced: “In 
seeking to build this new, democratic political order, Akaev had to work with a 
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constitution created and parliament elected under the old Soviet order” since the elections 
held in February 1990 returned a majority of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet.220 
Essentially, the group that formed the post-independence parliament received their 
political mandate during the end of the Soviet times, and continued to hold power until 
Kyrgyzstan conducted its first post-transition parliamentary elections in February 
1995.221 Akaev, who stood for public elections, albeit unopposed in 1991, governed 
alongside the same elites whose mandate had not been confirmed by the public during the 
initial pre-constitutional period.222 Anderson’s words, as he describes the elite group, 
particularly those in parliament, explain the situation: “This body very much represented 
the Kyrgyz elite. Most came from privileged positions, from the families that had 
dominated the political system during the Soviet period; most were committed to the 
existing political order, albeit, in some cases, to a reformed version.”223 Therefore, while 
Akaev and the legislature had both held power prior to independence, the imbalance 
among the legislature appears convincingly with the old order. The president’s views, 
however, differed substantially.224  
Initially, Akaev consistently clashed with the old elite who now dominated the 
legislature, representing a new voice in Kyrgyz politics. Akaev’s positions regarding the 
constitution, the nature of economic and political reforms—among other issues such as 
national language and the role of religion and tribal ties in the new state—caused 
significant infighting, coordination, and negotiation inconsistent with a consolidated 
imbalance of power.225 Thus, when taking Akaev’s role into consideration, neither the 
president nor the legislature had enough consolidated power to push through their own 
version of the constitution or reforms.226  
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For this reason, from Akaev’s assumption of power until after the approval of the 
constitution, the executive and legislative branches of the Kyrgyz government kept each 
other in check and each advocated its own policy objectives.227 The efforts to develop the 
constitution, discussed next, prove an excellent example of how the balance of power 
forced a tense, but cooperative, effort. Of course, this balance could also be seen only as 
infighting among the members of the old guard, since efforts were taken to keep new 
candidates out of the process, but the ideological differences regarding market reforms 
and democracy appear to have separated the elite groups along ideological lines, in 
addition to political power.228  
After the enactment of the constitution, however, the power dynamics changed, 
particularly in response to President Akaev’s changing political views.229 Due to tension 
between the two branches – which continually grew over the deteriorating economy, and 
accusations of corruption permeating the elite circles – a stalemate developed, rather than 
a cooperative environment.230 Akaev used the December 1993 parliamentary vote of no 
confidence to dismiss the government, despite the fact the parliament failed to reach the 
necessary two-thirds required for such action, in an effort to end the impasse and increase 
his personal power.231 This appeared to be one of Akaev’s first attempts to govern 
without parliamentary input, but as time went on Akaev used similar tactics numerous 
times to tip the power balance in his favor.  
Perhaps Akaev attempted to increase his power in a sincere effort to push through 
meaningful reform, but his methods—changing the constitution, dissolving parliament, 
and silencing media opposition—denoted an apparent shift in his philosophy.232 
According to John Anderson, “Akaev appeared to take a step back from his earlier 
enthusiasm for liberal democracy, suggesting that the simple application of Western style 
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parliamentarianism might be inappropriate in the Central Asian context…Akaev argued 
that this required some rethinking of the balance of power between executive and 
legislature.”233 This belief materialized in Akaev’s subsequent actions as a series of 
“flawed elections and constitutional changes pushed through by the president” indicated 
that Akaev was “reverting to Central Asian type, with a thin veneer of democratic 
rhetoric and practice disguising more authoritarian forms of rule.”234 Essentially, the 
president’s use of all available methods at his disposal to increase his relative power and 
push through his objectives signaled an end to his efforts to compromise with the 
legislature and his decision to rule by unbalanced presidential power.  
In a particularly demonstrative example, Akaev amended the constitution in 1996, 
changing over 50 percent of the document.235 This action increased the constitutional 
power of the president considerably, thus ensuring an increased power imbalance in favor 
of Akaev and his supporters.236 In doing so, Akaev’s disproportionate share of power 
changed the political landscape in Kyrgyzstan, ushering in an imbalanced situation that 
significantly affected levels of democratic development. Akaev’s power concentration 
continued until its abrupt end in 2005 when he was removed from power.  
From that point on, political infighting between the president and his supporters, 
and other elites in the legislature, characterized the political environment in Kyrgyzstan 
during the post-Akaev era. The in-groups switched back and forth between factions as 
each fought for influence and access to power. Details of these competitions, including 
the accusations of corruption, the civil disturbances, and other significant events are not 
reviewed here, owing to space constraints and due to the emphasis on the initial period 
and the initial leadership (Akaev) in this thesis. The important point remains, however, 
that the post-Akaev political dynamics in Kyrgyzstan were fluid and volatile.  
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2. Conclusions  
At first glance, since most of the elites moved from positions in the Soviet 
government into comparable ones in the new regime, it would be logical to say that there 
was an imbalance favoring the old regime. On the other hand, however, President Akaev, 
with his unique background in science and commitment to reforms, served as a successful 
counter balance to the former Soviet elites who had smoothly transitioned into the 
legislature and other significant political posts in the new regime.237 In addition, Akaev’s 
initial commitment to democratic ideals, unlike many elites who resisted reforms, also 
seems to reflect the distinction McFaul mentioned between elites that favored democracy, 
and those that did not. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that a power balance between the 
elites, a balance between their ideas and ideologies and not just their political power, 
existed in Kyrgyzstan directly following independence between 1991 and 1993. 
Essentially, McFaul’s categorization of a power imbalance favoring the dictators appears 
to focus heavily on the individuals who remained in office and underemphasizes the role 
that Akaev played in countering those deputies in parliament who clung to the old 
regime.238 The Freedom House score at independence (1991) supports this claim as a 4.5 
score and a “partially free” ranking would be more consistent with a balance of power 
within the leadership, rather than an imbalanced situation that favored the non-democrats.  
Looking beyond the initial period of independence at Akaev’s growing power 
concentration after 1993, and the rapid changes in power dynamics and the resulting 
instability of the post-Akaev era, the longer term situation in Kyrgyzstan also seems to 
suggest a more balanced beginning than McFaul concluded. As the Balance of 
Leadership Theory suggests, rather than a consolidated democracy or autocracy resulting 
from a power imbalance, a third option exists:  
In between these two extremes were countries in which the distribution of 
power between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal. 
Rather than producing stalemate, compromise, and pacted transitions to 
democracy, such situations in the postcommunist world resulting in 
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protracted confrontation, yielding unconsolidated, unstable partial 
democracies and autocracies.239  
In essence, based on the evidence, it appears that Kyrgyzstan’s political dynamics 
between 1991 and 1993 fit this “relatively equal” description provided by the theory, and 
correspondingly threw the country into a pattern of governance that fluctuated between 
democracy and dictatorship. The political infighting and power competition during this 
initial period kept Kyrgyzstan from consolidating any particular regime type in the way 
that Russia or the other Central Asian countries managed, despite several instances in 
which the regime registered as “not free,” possibly signaling a slide towards a stable 
autocracy.  
The first Kyrgyz experience with an authoritarian backlash, and a swing in power 
dynamics away from the initial balance, occurred as early as 1994 when Akaev began to 
act in a manner more characteristic of the former regime. By 2005, Akaev had become 
fully engrossed in increasing his already substantial power in a way more typical of the 
rulers of other Central Asian states. The Freedom House scores seem to support this 
conclusion, showing continuous movement towards a less free status from 1994 to 2004. 
The Freedom House scores from 2002, when McFaul published his article, matched the 
political situation at the time, showing a 5.5, “not free” rating, at the point when Akaev 
had increased his power but had not yet lost it to popular demand. Rather than concluding 
as McFaul did, that the more authoritarian administration emerged due to Akaev’s ties to 
the ancien régime and would therefore lead to long-standing non-democracy, this analysis 
views the autocratic swing as a response to the balance initially created, in part due to 
Akaev’s initial commitment to democracy, and a momentary shift to be expected of an 
unconsolidated regime.  
The fact that the first authoritarian backlash by Akaev in 1994 was followed by 
additional power swings throughout the post-Akaev period supports the conclusion that 
Kyrgyzstan’s situation was predictably volatile in a way consistent with an initial 
balance, rather than firmly authoritarian as an imbalance would suggest. For instance, the 
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power dynamics and democratic levels changed after events in 2005 and 2010 when 
Akaev and Bakiyev were each popularly ousted from power. After the change in 
leadership, efforts were made to pursue more democratic policies, representing a shift 
away from autocracy and toward a partial democracy. These changes illustrate that the 
initial balance contributed to Kyrgyzstan’s inability to consolidate its regime type as 
either a democracy or an authoritarian form of rule.  
Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s oscillations between democracy and dictatorship are 
consistent with McFaul’s theory and also help explain Kyrgyzstan’s changes in 
leadership dynamics between 2002 and 2016. As stated, the instability created by the 
original balance developed an unstable foundation that neither solidified into a full 
democracy nor a consolidated authoritarian regime. Essentially, the initial leadership 
power balance led to a partial democracy that fluctuated between extremes, exactly what 
Kyrgyzstan demonstrated from independence up to its current situation, with the political 
factions consistently vying for power to differing levels of impact to democratic 
development. From this perspective, the Balance of Leadership Theory explains the 
current “partially free,” 5 scoring regime, in addition to the volatile Freedom House 
scores the country has seen over the years, precisely because Kyrgyzstan failed to fall 
into either category.  
In comparison, the leadership dynamics in Kyrgyzstan have been more volatile 
and have followed a less predictable trajectory than experienced in Russia. Explaining 
this volatility in part, initially the competing elite groups used more negotiation and 
discussion in post-independent Kyrgyzstan, as compared to the pre-Soviet period, to 
enact policy and reforms. The development of the constitution serves as a prime example.  
D. KYRGYZSTAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
The following section begins by providing the important evidence needed to 
define the type of constitution developed in the post-Soviet content, and uses that 
information to offer conclusions regarding the role of constitutional framework in 
Kyrgyzstan’s democratic development.  
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1. Evidence 
As mentioned, the development of the constitution serves as a prime example of 
the tension, negotiation, and eventual cooperation that existed among the Kyrgyz elites 
during the initial post-Soviet period.240 Work on a new constitution began in earnest in 
1992 even though there was still little consensus between the Akaev camp and the 
parliamentarians on the way forward regarding reform, marketization, or 
democratization.241 Anderson explains the political situation leading up to the 
constitution as follows: “Though many of these deputies opted for Akaev in October 
1990, this did not represent a clear body of support for the marketisation and 
democratisation that he increasingly advocated, with many parliamentarians fearful that 
such reforms would threaten their economic well-being and political influence.”242 
Therefore, it was from a political context in which the major players were concerned with 
ensuring and consolidating their own power that Kyrgyzstan’s first post-Soviet 
constitution emerged.  
The debate regarding the initial constitution included a number of controversial 
topics in addition to the discussion of institutional powers. The elites in Kyrgyzstan 
considered concerns such as the “status of the Russian language, the position of women, 
and the question of whether the constitution should make some reference to the values 
promoted by the state,” in addition to economic and political issues.243 For example, 
Akaev wanted the preamble to mention the values of Islam, while other elites suggested 
other moral principles for inclusion.244 The sensitive nature of these topics, as well as 
other tribal and regional factors, added time and divisiveness to the negotiations, but 
ultimately contributed substantially to the final product.  
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Aside from the issues unique to Kyrgyzstan, the elites’ main concern remained 
the more common discussion of the distribution of power among the parliamentary and 
presidential institutions. Akaev took issue with the 1992 draft version because he viewed 
the document as one that gave too much power to the parliament and ignored “the 
realities of a situation where strong executive power was necessary to hold the country 
together and push through reform.”245 Akaev continued to insist that the country was not 
prepared for democracy and that a constitutionally empowered president was necessary to 
ensure progress for the country in advancing economic and political initiatives. Some 
parliamentary deputies thought that Akaev could handle such institutional power, based 
on his reputation for supporting democratization and market reform, but not all the elites 
agreed that future leaders could be trusted with such great amounts of constitutionally 
vested power.246 Unfortunately, as time wore on Akaev’s increasing desire to centralize 
control, and his use of the constitution to do so, undermined his objectivity and bolstered 
the legislature’s concerns about presidential power concentration.247 The discussions and 
negotiations over the constitution’s content continued for months as consensus regarding 
the legal powers of the different branches of government proved difficult to reach.  
In the end, the version put before the parliament balanced the power between the 
office of the president and the deputies in parliament (called the Jogorku Kenesh).248 The 
compromise document, developed with an effort on both sides to purposely avoid “the 
dangers of a Russian style confrontation between president and parliament” during 
negotiations, was enacted in May 1993.249 A detailed examination of that document 
follows in order to outline the particulars that help categorize the original version of the 
constitutional framework.  
Unfortunately, Krouwel’s examination of twelve constitutional frameworks did 
not include the Central Asian countries, so his assessments cannot be used to supplement 
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the words of Kyrgyzstan’s actual constitution, as was done in the Russian case study. The 
template inspired by his article, however, will be used to determine the constitutional 
framework of Kyrgyzstan’s original constitution from 1993. Table 15 pertains to this 
framework.  




As Table 15 indicates, Kyrgyzstan’s original constitution falls squarely into the 
mixed category of constitutional frameworks. Of the seven indicators, the 1993 version 
displayed all “mixed” characteristics. Anderson provides an assessment of the document 
noting both the distribution of power between branches, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s 
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uniqueness within the region: “In practice the final draft put before parliament was 
relatively balanced in the distribution of powers when compared to that of most 
neighbouring states.”250 In dissecting the constitution, Anderson’s assessment proves 
accurate as the document provides substantial constitutionally approved authorities to the 
office of the president, but also ensures significant limiting powers in the other branches 
of government.251 Particularly in comparison with the amended 1996 version, the 
original 1993 constitution shows an institutional framework that legally enshrines powers 
typical of a mixed system.252  
The following explanations helped develop Table 15 and explain how Kyrgyzstan 
fits the mixed constitutional framework. As with Russia, sometimes the constitutional 
framework would appear to fall between two classifications within a particular factor. In 
other words, at times the Kyrgyz constitution showed a mixed framework with elements 
favoring presidential power dynamics, or conversely, a mixed framework with an 
indication of a parliamentary power imbalance. In these cases, notes are provided to 
highlight the nuances. Of course, this original version is not the same as the currently 
approved document, as Kyrgyzstan’s constitution has been changed several times, most 
recently in 2010.  
Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s original constitution demonstrated its mixed constitutional 
framework in the following ways:  
• (Head of State Elections) The president was directly elected vice indirectly 
elected by the legislature in accordance with Article 44.253 The president 
appoints the head of the government, the prime minister, with consent 
from the legislature, per Articles 46 and 58, respectively.254 This 
arrangement has a hint of presidentialism, but the parliamentary approval 
keeps it within the mixed category.  
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253 “The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 Version,” Article 44.  
254 Ibid., Articles 46 and 58; Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy?, 27. 
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• (Dissolution of the Government) Both the president and the legislature 
have the constitutional right to dissolve the parliament before the end of 
the term, but with caveats. For the Jogorku Kenesh, two-thirds of the 
deputies must agree per Article 63 of the constitution. For both the 
president and the parliament, a national referendum must support the 
effort.255 The referendum clause offers a check on unfettered use of this 
authority by the president.  
• (Appointing Cabinet and Ministers) The structure and procedures for 
establishing the government are outlined in Articles 70 and 71, and 
indicate that the president accepts the structure of the Government once 
presented by the prime minister. The Jogorku Kenesh must approve the 
government per Article 46 as well as Article 71.256 The balance here 
favors the parliament, but since the president is still involved, the factor 
remains in the mixed category, albeit showing a tendency towards 
parliamentarianism.  
• (Responsible to the Parliament/Vote of Investiture) The parliament must 
consent to the prime minister and the composition of the cabinet as 
presented by the president and parliament, respectively.257  
• (Legislative Powers) The constitution grants legislative powers to several 
branches according to Article 64, which states: “The right to initiate laws 
shall be vested in the Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh, the President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Supreme 
Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Supreme Economic Court of the 
Kyrgyz Republic and people’s initiative—30,000 of electors.” 
Additionally, according to Article 7: “state power in the Kyrgyz Republic 
shall be vested in and exercised by: The Legislative Power—by the 
Jogorku Kenesh.”258 This body has significant powers to enact laws, as 
enumerated in Article 58. The president, on the other hand, can initiate his 
own bills and submit them to the Jogorku Kenesh, as well as sign into law 
legislation presented by the parliament.259 While the president can return 
legislation to the Jogorku Kenesh, a two-thirds majority can force the 
president to sign into law these parliament-approved bills.260  
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257 “The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 Version,” Articles 46, 58, and 71.  
258 Ibid., Article 7.  
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• (Executive Powers) The constitutional provisions for executive power 
state that “The Executive Power in the Kyrgyz Republic shall be vested in 
the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic…” per Article 69 and in 
accordance with Article 7.261 The executive is further defined by Article 
70 as consisting of “the Prime Minister of Kyrgyz Republic, Vice-Prime 
Ministers, Ministers and Chairmen of state committees of the Kyrgyz 
Republic.”262 The omission of the president in this article stands out, 
although, per the constitution, the president determines the structure of the 
Government (with the approval of the parliament) and “shall exercise 
control over the work of the Government.”263 This delineation seems to 
purposely distance the president from the executive, although not 
completely. Both the government and the president have powers to issue 
decrees, which extend the scope of their power, per Articles 74 and 48 
respectively.264 Moreover, both the president and the parliament have the 
power to call for referendums, an important authority as shown by Kyrgyz 
history.  
• (No Confidence) Votes of no confidence may be initiated by the 
legislature per Article 58, which states that the parliament shall “decide 
the question of confidence to the Government of the republic or its 
individual member by a majority of 2/3rds from the total number of 
Deputies by secret ballot.”265 Article 58 is the only passage in the 1993 
constitution that refers to votes of no confidence. Since only the 
parliament and the cabinet are involved in this particular factor, the 
constitution blends the mixed and parliamentary categorizations. Because 
the constitution does not explicitly state if the government must resign if it 
loses a vote of no confidence, however, this last category proves difficult 
to determine. The 1993 version serves as a contrast to the 1996 version, on 
the other hand; the latter specifically outlines the authorities in Article 
71.266 The change to this factor indicates a more presidential-type 
arrangement in 1996 as compared to 1993, yet still in the mixed category. 
This suggests that the original version did not give the president enough 
power, so it was changed, a further indication that the factor was viewed 
as balanced (or mixed) originally.267 
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As mentioned, after the enactment of the initial constitution, the politicians made 
a number of changes, which created political volatility much in the same way as the 
changes in leadership dynamics. President Akaev began the process of negotiating and 
influencing changes as early as 1994, but debates over the constitution have continued 
over the years as politicians have tried to use the document to manipulate the political 
system. For instance, Akaev’s efforts were rewarded, particularly in 1996, when an 
amended constitution significantly increased the constitutional powers of the president at 
the expense of the legislature.268  
According to Krouwel’s formula, the 1996 amended constitution showed four 
tendencies that appeared more “presidential” (Head of State Elections, Dissolving 
Government, Legislative Powers, and Executive Powers) and three characteristics that 
looked typically “mixed” (the Appointing Cabinet and Ministers, Responsible to the 
Parliament in a Vote of Investiture, and Vote of No Confidence).269 While these 
classifications have not been explained in detail, the research suggests that in changing 
the document so dramatically, the politicians moved the constitution closer to a 
presidential rather than a mixed framework in 1996 and helped Akaev consolidate his 
political position.270 In addition, the 1996 version proved important as it was the first 
major change from the original version and demonstrated how Akaev’s changes in 
political leanings affected the fundamental institutions.  
In the post-Akaev era, the desired form of mixed framework has oscillated over 
the years, resulting in additional substantial alterations in 2003, 2006, 2007, and 2010. 
These periods of significant amendments to the constitution still appeared to exist within 
the context of a mixed framework, but in ways that fundamentally changed the character 
of the document.  
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2. Conclusions 
The original constitution displays a politically balanced document with a mixed 
framework that legally enshrines power for each branch of the government and is 
consistent with the scholarly assessment presented in Chapter III. This balanced nature 
makes sense since the elites spent months during its development negotiating and 
debating the details of the document. Admittedly, the constitutional development phase 
featured infighting and power struggles amongst the different elites between 1991 and 
1993, but the process led to a combined result, with even President Akaev advocating for 
a cooperative effort.271 In other words, the balanced, mixed nature of the 1993 
constitution correlates with the leadership balance and the process in which the document 
was developed.  
Interestingly, the Freedom House numbers tell a similar tale. As Table 14 showed, 
the initial constitutional framework appears consistent with the Constitutional Framework 
Theory since Kyrgyzstan had a mixed, balanced constitution and a Freedom House score 
in the “partially free” range at 4.5. From 1991 to 1993, the discussion over the 
constitution and the balance between branches appeared to contribute to an increase in 
the overall levels of democracy with Kyrgyzstan obtaining Freedom House scores 
between 3 and 4. Thus, based on the data and consideration of the historical events, the 
in-depth analysis conducted here regarding the initial conditions concludes that between 
1991 and 1993 Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional framework supported the Constitutional 
Framework Theory. The initial constitution, in force from 1991 to 1994, had a mixed 
framework that corresponded with the lower and “partially free” scores.  
Moving beyond the initial period, however, the details and the trends are harder to 
ascertain without further analysis, particularly regarding the major constitutional changes. 
Despite the mixed nature of the original constitution, the document itself and the 
constitutional balance it established did not endure for long as its character became more 
presidential through amendments in 1996 and again in 2006. To further complicate the 
analysis, subsequent efforts to overturn the constitution’s presidential nature led to 
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counteracting changes in 2003, 2007, and 2010. The correlation between these changes 
and their effects on levels of democratic freedom remain unclear as the Freedom House 
numbers do not register movement following each period of constitutional change. For 
instance, between 1994 and 2004, roughly the same period in which Akaev concentrated 
on centralizing his power through constitutional amendments and other methods, levels 
of democratic development dropped consistently from 3.5 to 5.5. After the 2003 
amendments, however, there was no immediately discernable change in democratic 
scores, with Kyrgyzstan being evaluated as 5.5 in 2003 and 2004. Similar results 
followed the 2006, 2007, and 2010 changes. If effects on democratic freedom did occur 
as a result of the changing nature of the constitution, they may have registered in later 
scores, but that correlation was not discovered here.  
On one hand, perhaps the number of substantial changes to the constitution over 
the years is the reason that the correlation proves so difficult to discern. For instance, the 
2006 constitution reduced presidential powers, but the 2007 version increased them 
again. With changes so rapid and polar, it makes sense that the fluctuations could not 
register significant changes in Freedom House assessments. On the other hand, the 
changes were all conducted within the originally developed mixed framework. To that 
end, perhaps the variations between the “2003 mixed” and the “2006 mixed” too proved 
insignificant to bring about changes in levels of democratic freedoms. In either case, 
without further consideration, this thesis can only confirm the correlation between the 
constitutional framework and levels of democracy from 1991 to 1993, but the analysis 
would benefit from further investigation of other time periods. For instance, the 2010 
version of the constitution, which was also adopted after a change in presidential 
leadership due to popular discontent, moved away from constitutional centralization of 
presidential power. Examination of this document could offer insight into why 
Kyrgyzstan’s current level of democracy continues to hold steady in the “partially free” 
range with a 5 score from Freedom House since 2010. Ultimately, a further, detailed 
investigation of the events in the post-Akaev era should be undertaken in order to help 
determine if the correlation between constitutional frameworks and levels of democracy 
continues after the initial transition period. Specifically, more data regarding the four 
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major alterations would help expand the analysis begun here with the 1993 constitution to 
other versions.  
From a “bigger picture” standpoint, however, without the benefit of examining 
the details of each of the several post-Akaev constitutions, the general trend of rapid and 
frequent change to the constitution still suggests that Kyrgyzstan supports the 
Constitutional Framework Theory. As with the leadership element, the unstable 
foundation created by choosing a purely mixed system led to increased fluidity and 
volatility within Kyrgyzstan’s political situation. For most of its history since 1991, the 
country fell between the two extremes, both in constitutional framework (mixed) and in 
democratic freedoms (3–5.5), just as the Constitutional Framework Theory would 
suggest. The overarching mixed framework, which varied between mixed with 
presidential tendencies to a more balanced mixed system, produced a middle ground over 
the longer term that allowed for greater flexibility, but that did not affect Kyrgyzstan’s 
“partially free” range of democratic freedom.  
In addition, the Kyrgyzstan case study suggests a correlation, similar to the 
Russian experience, which indicates that a mixed constitution proves easier for governing 
elites to manipulate. In essence, the Kyrgyzstan case study seems to suggest that its 
mixed constitutional framework’s intermediate position, between pure 
parliamentarianism and pure presidentialism, allows for easier alteration, just as the 
Constitutional Framework Theory posits.  
E. SUMMATION—CONSIDERING THE COMBINATION HYPOTHESIS  
As with Russia, a deeper look into the inner dynamics and nuances of the 
Kyrgyzstan case study shows greater support for the Combination Hypothesis than the 
initial determination suggested. Considering, as the Combination Hypothesis argues, the 
crucial juncture—the balance between the leadership at the point of constitutional 
development—Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet political evolution generally supports the theory. 
Since the strength of the president and his loyalists effectively countered the holdovers 
from the Soviet era dominating the legislature, the power dynamics led to a cooperative 
effort on the initial constitution. Even though most of the elites involved in this process 
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had been members of the Communist Party, their post-transition approaches to reform, 
their ideological differences, and their own interests led both sides to compromise on the 
constitution. As a result of the balance and compromise, a mixed constitutional 
framework, which showed definite efforts to check and balance the different branches of 
government, emerged in 1993.  
Unfortunately, the balance between leadership groups eventually turned into an 
imbalance that changed the fragile mixed system. As the leadership dynamics have 
oscillated between groups in the years since independence, the constitutional framework 
has been dragged through corresponding fluctuations. The importance of the leadership in 
the beginning, however, particularly Akaev’s initial support for democracy, appears to be 
a key dynamic that ensured a less presidential constitutional framework than the other 
Central Asian countries. Akaev’s efforts to reform, and the resulting effort to avoid 
power centralization within the institutions, created a comparatively more balanced 
constitution and society in Kyrgyzstan. The fragility of this balance was demonstrated 
when Akaev’s commitment to democratic practices waned and the constitutional 
institutions changed dramatically. This demonstrates not only the apparent vulnerability 
of a mixed framework, but the importance a single leader can have on institutional 
development and the democratic nature of a state.  
Finally, the changes in leadership balance and constitutional framework appear 
related to the initial period, as the inability to consolidate regime type from the outset has 
continued throughout most of Kyrgyzstan’s post-independence history. Arguably, this 
situation might have proved different if Akaev had initially joined the other, old-regime 
communists, or if a single coalition had worked the process to enact a constitution 
designed in its favor. Interestingly, there have been points in Kyrgyzstan’s history at 
which power centralization or constitutional framework development could have altered 
the regime’s character, as with Russia, but for Kyrgyzstan, balance and instability have 
seemed to triumph over full-fledged consolidation.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The case study examinations of Russia and Kyrgyzstan offered additional insight 
into the particulars of two republics, as well as the general applicability of the Balance of 
Leadership Theory, the Constitutional Framework Theory, and the Combination 
Hypothesis in the post-Soviet context. In addition, the case studies and the thesis overall 
identified areas that would benefit from additional research.  
As stated within their respective chapters, understanding of both Russia’s and 
Kyrgyzstan’s political situations and democratic development can be enhanced when 
viewed through the lenses of the Balance of Leadership Theory and the Constitutional 
Framework Theory. Particularly at the country’s point of transition, both the leadership 
dynamics and the type of constitutional framework chosen have contributed to past and 
present levels of democratic development.  
In Russia, the initial power balance fell away quickly as Yeltsin consolidated his 
power and set the stage for Putin’s further power concentration. This consolidation of 
leadership contributed to the strangling of Russia’s democratic development, and was 
aided by the country’s initial constitutional framework. The mixed system, with its 
overtly presidential character, reduced Russia’s ability to pursue democratization as it 
allowed the non-democratic elites to concentrate power and manipulate the institutional 
framework in a manner that continues to affect Russian levels of democratic 
development. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the initially fragile balance in leadership between the president and 
the legislature provided an unstable foundation that has continued to shift throughout the 
decades since independence. The truly mixed framework of the original constitution 
contributed to the instability, as the institutional foundation changed as regularly as the 
power dynamics shifted among the elites. Both factors have fostered the ups and downs 
that Kyrgyzstan has experienced throughout its democratic development.  
While both the Balance of Leadership and the Constitutional Framework Theories 
contributed to the understanding of each state’s level of democratic success, the union of 
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these two factors in the Combination Hypothesis provides a new and compelling 
perspective from which to examine the democratic success of the post-Soviet republics. 
The Combination Hypothesis focuses on the crucial juncture or connection between the 
initial leadership dynamics and the type of constitutional framework the elites chose for 
the original constitution. Basically, by considering the balance of power within the elites, 
the type of constitution enacted can often be explained and understood. Since the 
constitutional framework often creates the institutional foundation of the country, which 
can either constrain or empower the leadership, the constitutional framework helps 
predict levels of democratic success. This hypothesis, explained in greater detail in 
Chapter III, appears to be a useful construct based on the evidence discovered through the 
two case studies. The Combination Hypothesis identifies linkages within the political 
dynamics of the post-Soviet republics that the Balance of Leadership Theory and the 
Constitutional Framework Theory cannot offer on their own.  
In Russia, the leadership imbalance favoring the executive in 1993, when the 
constitution was enacted, has contributed to the strongly presidential constitution that has 
facilitated encroachment on democratic freedoms to this day. In Kyrgyzstan, the fragile 
balance among the elites led to cooperation during the constitution building process, 
resulting in a purely mixed constitution. This constitution, one easily amended based on 
the relative power dynamics between the executive and the legislature, appears to have 
contributed to, or detracted from, the level of democracy in the country depending on the 
version in force at the time. For both nations, the ties between the power dynamics 
among the initial elites, the resulting original constitution, and the follow-on levels of 
democratic development appear inextricably linked, just as the Combination Hypothesis 
would suggest.  
In addition, the apparent differences between the countries, which cannot be 
explained by either the Balance of Leadership Theory or the Constitutional Framework 
Theory alone, can be understood through the Combination Hypothesis. While both 
countries had relative balances at the point of transition and developed mixed 
constitutional frameworks, Russia has grown increasingly non-democratic since the 1991 
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transition while Kyrgyzstan continues to oscillate between partial democracy and non-
democracy.  
The divergence in democratic paths can be explained by the different situation 
each country faced at the Combination Hypothesis’ crucial juncture. Essentially, Russia 
showed signs of growing authoritarianism at the point when the initial elites constructed 
the original constitution, while Kyrgyzstan displayed elements of disunity and 
uncertainty. Yeltsin’s ability to consolidate a power imbalance, which he used to 
influence the development of the strongly presidential constitution, differed significantly 
from Akaev’s relative power balance with the other elites, which led to a compromise, 
mixed constitution. The fact that the Combination Hypothesis can be used to explain both 
sets of circumstances indicates that as a construct, it has an element of flexibility and 
nuance that looks beyond explanations provided by either the Balance of Leadership 
Theory of the Constitutional Framework Theory alone.  
While the details of the Russian and Kyrgyz examples appear to support the 
Combination Hypothesis, further examination of the circumstances beyond the initial 
transition period for each country would test the construct. For instance, as mentioned in 
Chapter VI, the Kyrgyzstan case study focused on the period immediately following 
independence until the end of the time in office of the first president, Akaev. Examining 
the post-Akaev period could offer further evidence that supports the Combination 
Hypothesis’ claim that Kyrgyzstan has had difficulty consolidating either form of 
government as a result of the initial power dynamics that developed a fragile, mixed 
constitutional framework.  
In addition, the investigation of the other former Soviet republics would also help 
confirm the utility of the Combination Hypothesis in analyzing the levels of democratic 
success achieved throughout the post-Soviet space. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 
IV, Lithuania provides an excellent opportunity to study how a mixed institutional setup 
could result in a fully formed democracy. Perhaps the Combination Hypothesis will show 
that the leadership dynamics at the point of transition favored the democrats and therefore 
the democratic elites formed a strongly parliamentary mixed constitution. This would 
explain why Lithuania appeared to behave as the Balance of Leadership Theory 
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predicted, but not the Constitutional Theory would predict. A study of the crucial 
junction established by the Combination Hypothesis would offer greater insight into the 
dynamics at transition for post-Soviet republics and could easily be expanded to consider 
any nation experiencing democratic transition. 
While the research supports the applicability and usefulness of the Combination 
Hypothesis, the framework does have some limitations. For instance, the Combination 
Hypothesis may place a disproportionate emphasis on the post-transition period. 
Essentially, the hypothesis implies that once the initial constitution is developed by the 
post-independence elites, the country’s democratic path can be predicted. Perhaps the 
idea of the crucial juncture (which usually occurs soon after the initial transition) could 
be expanded to include other points at which the leadership dramatically changes the 
institutional framework.  
Determining which situations would be applicable might prove harder to 
enumerate and track, but there might be some utility in acknowledging that while the first 
post-transition leadership dynamics and corresponding constitution are the most 
important variables, the initial crucial juncture may not be the only time at which the 
leadership dynamics and constitutional framework factors combine to affect levels of 
democracy.  
In fact, Kyrgyzstan might offer the ideal case. It is noteworthy that Kyrgyzstan 
has significantly amended its constitution five times. Future study could ascertain if there 
is a link between the prevailing leadership balance in Kyrgyzstan, the resulting 
constitutional change, and levels of democratic freedom, for each of the substantial 
amendments. Such an investigation would add clarity regarding temporal considerations. 
In other words, the research in this thesis shows that the correlation between the initial 
power dynamics and the type of constitutional foundation can emerge at different points 
in each country, but further study would increase understanding of when that juncture 
occurs for additional states.  
Aside from the lessons learned regarding the usefulness of the Balance of 
Leadership Theory, the Constitutional Framework Theory, and the Combination 
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Hypothesis, this thesis offers other observations worth consideration. First, the unique 
nature of the mixed constitutional framework came to light in both the Russian and 
Kyrgyz chapters. Based on the data presented in Chapter III and the evidence provided by 
the case studies, unlike the pure parliamentary or pure presidential systems, which 
adhered strongly to the Constitutional Framework Theory,272 the mixed frameworks and 
their resulting regime types vary more extensively. Perhaps the inherently balanced 
nature of the mixed systems creates a fragility and susceptibility to change less prevalent 
in the other constitutional frameworks. The balance within the mixed system often 
creates a regime that offers greater opportunity for manipulation and change in part 
because it fails to isolate or concentrate the power within one branch of the government. 
This may help explain the variance between different mixed systems as well as their 
volatility. Some literature supports this claim as scholars have written about differences 
in what are often called “semi-presidential” systems. Additional research, however, might 
add clarity as to how the mixed systems behave in a post-Soviet context specifically.  
Along the same lines, while the institutional framework appears to be important in 
determining the long-term levels of democratic success, between the constitutional 
framework and the balance of leadership, the leadership dynamics may prove more 
important when considering the likelihood of democratic development. As the 
Combination Hypothesis argues, the leadership at the point of transition often determines 
the constitutional framework or institutional system. Therefore, the constitutional 
framework may just be a reflection of the leadership’s ideology or desired regime type. 
The leaders that support democracy will find ways to protect those values in the 
constitutional frameworks, and the leaders that prefer autocratic power will attempt to 
manipulate the institutional system to further their authoritarian objectives.  
President Akaev from the Kyrgyz case serves as an excellent example. His early 
commitment to democracy and reform balanced the less democratically minded 
legislature and ensured the enactment of a compromise and mixed constitutional 
framework. Standing out from his Central Asian peers, Akaev’s initial commitment to 
                                                 
272 According to the theory, the pure parliamentary system equals democracy, while the pure 
presidential system equals dictatorship. 
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democracy may help explain the higher levels of democratic development experienced in 
Kyrgyzstan as compared to the other Central Asian countries, despite his later turn 
towards authoritarianism. Essentially, Akaev’s initial pro-reform mentality created the 
institutions that later constrained his increased political ambition and attempts at power 
concentration. Perhaps the Akaev example suggests that at the point of transition, or the 
crucial juncture, the leadership balance may be able to ensure democratic institutions, but 
the constitutional framework may not be able to develop democratically minded elites. If 
this hypothesis is correct, and future research would need to be conducted to determine 
its validity, the formation of democratic elites must precede the development of 
institutions in order to successfully promote democratic rule. If this is true, this 
suggestion could have important implications for democratic development.  
Overall, this thesis presented a number of conclusions derived from the research 
that help account for the differing levels of democratic success achieved by the post-
Soviet republics. From a political theory standpoint, this study provided feedback on the 
validity of two established theories, McFaul’s “Balance of Leadership Theory,” and 
Stepan and Skach’s “Constitutional Framework Theory;” the applicability of an original 
“Combination Hypothesis;” and some general notes on regional comparisons and 
exceptions. From a historical perspective, this thesis offered insight into two post-Soviet 
cases—Russia and Kyrgyzstan—that provide a deeper understanding of the general 
phenomenon through an analysis of their particular dynamics. This work has aimed to 
shed light on some of the factors that contribute to the differing levels of democratization 
among the post-Soviet republics, and to help build the foundation for future studies into 
the democratic development of transitioning states. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A. Freedom House Scores for the Post-Soviet Republics (1991–2016)273 
 
 
                                                 
273 Freedom House scores from 1975–2016. “About Freedom in the World.”  
ARMENIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Comparative Score 
(1 Low; 100 High)
Freedom 
Score 5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4.5 4.5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5 5 5 5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.326923 2016 = 46
Civil 
Liberties 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2015 = 46
Political 
Rights 5 4 3 3 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 2014 = 43
AZERBAIJAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 5 5 6 6 6 5.5 5 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 6.5 6.5 5.557692 2016 = 16
Civil 
Liberties 5 5 6 6 6 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 2015 = 20
Political 
Rights 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 2014 = 22
BELARUS Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 4 3.5 4.5 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.884615 2016 = 17
Civil 
Liberties 4 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2015 = 14
Political 
Rights 4 4 5 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2014 = 14
ESTONIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.442308 2016 = 94
Civil 
Liberties 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2015 = 95
Political 





















































GEORGIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 5.5 4.5 5 5 4.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3.788462 2016 = 64
Civil 
Liberties 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015 = 64
Political 
Rights 6 4 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2014 = 63
KAZAKHSTAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 4.5 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.423077 2016 = 24
Civil 
Liberties 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2015 = 24
Political 
Rights 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2014 = 25
KYRGYZSTAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 4.5 3 4 3.5 4 4 4 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.730769 2016 = 38
Civil 
Liberties 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2015 = 38
Political 
Rights 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2014 = 39
LATVIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 2.5 3 3 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.826923 2016 = 86
Civil 
Liberties 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2015 = 85
Political 
Rights 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2014 = 84
LITHUANIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.403846 2016 = 91
Civil 
Liberties 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2015 = 91
Political 































































MOLDOVA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 4.5 5 5 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.480769 2016 = 60
Civil 
Liberties 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015 = 63
Political 
Rights 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2014 = 64
RUSSIA Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4.5 5 5 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 6 6 4.826923 2016 = 22
Civil 
Liberties 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 2015 = 23
Political 
Rights 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2014 = 26
TAJIKISTAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 6 6 6.5 6.5 5.961538 2016 = 16
Civil 
Liberties 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 2015 = 22
Political 
Rights 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 2014 = 24
TURKMENISTAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 5.5 6.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6.923077 2016 = 4
Civil 
Liberties 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2015 = 6
Political 
Rights 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2014 = 7
UKRAINE Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 3 3 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 4 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3.269231 2016 = 61
Civil 
Liberties 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015 = 62
Political 


































































UZBEKISTAN Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Freedom 
Score 5.5 6 7 7 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6.730769 2016 = 3
Civil 
Liberties 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2015 = 4
Political 






















Table B. Matrix Based on Krouwel’s Study to Determine Type of Constitutional Framework 
Substantial Executive  
  Presidential  Parliamentary Mixed 
HEAD OF STATE ELECTIONS 
Direct Election of Head of 
State 
Indirect Election of Head 
of State 
Directly Elected President; 
Government Drawn from 
Directly Elected Legislative 
        
DISSOLVING GOVERNMENT 
President Can Dissolve 
Parliament and Call Elections 
Government/PM Can 
Dissolve Parliament 
President Can Dissolve 
Parliament and Call Elections 
        
APPOINTING 
CABINET/MINISTERS 
Head of State Directly 
Involved in Formation of Govt 
(Appt Ministers) 
Head of State Has No 
Formal Powers in 
Formation of Govt 
The Head of State Can Appoint 
Ministers that have to be 
Approved by Parliament 
        
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO 
PARLI/VOTE OF INVESTITURE 
Government and Ministers 
Not Responsible to Parliament 
Government Needs to 
Win a Vote of Investiture 
in Parliament 
Government is Responsible to 
Parliament 
        
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
President Can Introduce 
Legislation and Veto 
Legislation from Parliament 
President Cannot 
Introduce Legislation Nor 
Veto Legislation 
President Can Introduce 
Legislation Only Within His 
Prerogatives 
        
EXECUTIVE POWERS  
Head of State Has Executive 
Powers 
Head of State Has No 
Executive Responsibilities 
President has Substantial 
Executive Prerogatives, but 
Most Executive Power Rests 
with PM and Cabinet 
        
NO CONFIDENCE 
Government Can Ignore a 
Parliamentary Vote of No 
Confidence 
Government Must Resign 
if it Loses a Vote of 
Confidence 
Government Must Resign if it 
Loses a Vote of Confidence 
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Country Date of Independence
Date of Current 
Constitution Change Constitution? Siaroff Assessment (2003) World Bank CIA WorldFactbook (2016) Elgie (2014)
Regime Type at 
Independence
Armenia 21 Sept 1991 5 July 1995 Amended 2005/2015 Mixed 1995 (Category 5) Presidential Republic Semi-Presi (1995) Mixed
Azerbaijan 30 August 1991 12 Nov 1995 Amended 2002/2009 NONE Presidential Republic Semi-Presi (1995) Mixed
Belarus 25 Aug 1991 early 1994 Amended 1996/2004/2015 Mixed 1994 (Category 5) Presidential Republic in name; author Semi-Presi (1996) Mixed
Estonia 20 Aug 1991/6 Sept 1991 28 June 1992 Amended several/2015 Parliamentary 1992 (Category 7) Assembly Elected President Parliamentary Democracy Parliamentary (R) Parliamentary
Georgia 9 April 1991 24 Aug 1995 Amended several/2013 Mixed 1994 (Category 5) Presidential Republic Semi-Presi (2004) Mixed
Kazakhstan 16 Dec 1991 28 Jan 1993 Amended several 1995/2011 NONE Presidential Republic in name; autho Semi-Presi (1993) Mixed
Kyrgyzstan 31 Aug 1991 Previous 1993 Latest 27 June 2010 NONE Presidential Republic Semi-Presi (1993) Mixed
Latvia 4 March 1990/6 Sept 1991 1922 Amended 1991/1993/2014 Parliamentary 1990 (Category 7) Parliamentary Parliamentary Democracy Parliamentary (R) Parliamentary
Lithuania 11 March 1990/6 Sept 1991 25 Oct 1992 Amended 2003 Mixed 1992 (Category 5) Presidential Parliamentary Democracy Semi-Presi (1992) Mixed
Moldova 27 Aug 1991 29 July 1994 Amended several 2010/2016* Mixed 1994 (Category 5) Presidential Republic Parliamentary (R) Date? Mixed
Russia 24 Aug 1991 12 July 1993 Amended 2008/2014 Mixed 1993 (Category 5) Presidential Federation Semi-Presi (1993) Mixed
Tajikistan 9 Sept 1991 6 Nov 1994 Amended 1999/2003/2014 NONE Presidential Republic Presidential  Presidential
Turkmenistan 27 Oct 1991 18 May 1992 Amended several 2008 NONE Presidential Presidential Republic in name; autho Presidential Presidential
Ukraine 24 Aug 1991 Previous   Latest 1996, Amended 2004, 2010, 2015 Mixed 1992 (Category 5) Presidential Republic Semi-Presi (1996) Mixed
Uzbekistan 1 Sept 1991 8 Dec 1992 Amended several/2014 NONE Presidential Republic in name; autho Presidential Presidential
Source: CIA World Factbook, 





CIA World Factbook, 
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